the weekly Standard

FEBRUARY 28, 2005

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BUSH DOES EUROPE
GERARD BAKER
JAMES M. GOLDGEIER & MICHAEL MCFAUL

A SWEDISH DILEMMA

Immigration and the Welfare State

CHRISTOPHER CALDWELL

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Young immigrant learning Swedish at a school in Solna, near Stockholm, February 16, 2005

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Isn't It Iranic?

The final results were announced Sunday, February 13, and it thus became necessary for American journalism's leading authorities to assign themselves the question, "What exactly do Iraq's historic elections portend?" Unfortunately, American journalism's leading authorities seem not to have assigned themselves any additional responsibility to answer this question intelligibly. Readers of our two leading daily papers, for example, were offered diametrically opposite—and irreconcilable—explanations of the vote.

On the one hand, you can choose to believe *Washington Post* diplomatic correspondent Robin Wright, whose analysis, "Iraq Winners Allied With Iran Are the Opposite of U.S. Vision," was a prediction of Khomeini-style medievalism in Baghdad. Wright, reporting from her desk in Washington about phone conversations she'd had with such as Juan Cole, "a University of Michigan expert on Iraq," announced that Bush administration hopes for a Western-friendly, secular Iraqi regime—"the antithesis of Iran's theocracy"—appear to have been thwarted. In "one of the greatest ironies of the U.S. intervention," Wright concluded, "Iraqis instead went to the polls and elected a government with a strong religious base—and very close ties to the Islamic republic next door."

Or maybe that's not what happened at all. A *New York Times* front-pager by Dexter Filkins, also published February 14 (though datelined "Baghdad"), confidently suggested that "the razor-thin margin apparently captured by the Shiite alliance here . . . seems almost certain to enshrine a weak government that will be unable to push through sweeping changes, like granting Islam a central role in the new Iraqi state." Filkins noted that the Shiite coalition now finds itself "opposed in nearly equal measure by an array of mostly secular minority parties," and that America's closest Iraqi allies, the Kurds, will all by themselves control more than a quarter of the country's new National Assembly. Filkins further noted that "Shiite leaders appeared to be scaling back their expectations" in a series of post-ballot moves that "seemed to ease fears among Iraq's Sunni, Kurd, and Christian minorities" about the possible establishment of a "strict Islamic state."

What's the truth, then? Robin Wright's dark-ages forecast? Or the sunnier Dexter Filkins version? THE SCRAPBOOK, claiming no special wisdom about Iraqi politics, but possessed of a paid-up subscription to the Nexis newsclip archive, has decided to go with Filkins and the *Times*—primarily on account of Robin Wright's reliance on the aforementioned Prof. Cole, whom the *Post* should more accurately have described as a "University of Michigan anti-Bush partisan" whose only consistent position is that U.S. Iraq policy is always wrong.

For instance: Cole now tells Wright that the new Iraqi government "will have very good relations with Iran. The Kurdish victory reinforces this conclusion. Talabani is very close to Tehran. In terms of regional geopolitics, this is not the outcome that the United States was hoping for." But it turns out this is the same Jalal Talabani whose opinions Cole has previously found it convenient to dismiss—as excessively "pro-American" and unrepresentative of the authentic "Arab voice." It further turns out that Cole, just a few months ago, was mocking reported CIA concerns that the Iraqi election might be manipulated in Tehran's favor. This business about significant Iranian influence over Iraqi politics, Cole sniffed, "doesn't hold water."

Except, it seems, when it does.

Robin Wright herself, incidentally, cannot fairly be accused of reflexive recourse to whatever construction of Middle East reality promises the gravest embarrassment to George W. Bush. Indeed, she is sometimes quite the optimist about Iraq. As recently as January 30, on *Larry King Live*, Wright was going out of her way to pooh-pooh one worst-case, post-election scenario then already becoming popular with the Bush-bashing crowd. "There are many in Iraq," she reminded her audience, "including the senior cleric Ayatollah Sistani, who has said over and over again that they don't want to copy Iran's theocratic system, that, in fact, they want a secular constitution, in which Islam plays an important role, but that doesn't call for religious rule by the clerics." It remains the case that "there's a tremendous difference between Arabs in Iraq and Persians in Iran," she pointed out.

No question, Wright told Larry King: Iraq's election "was a great day for the United States."

How's that for irony? ♦

Pyongyang's Joke

He has weird hair, peculiar and sordid personal habits, and his people are enslaved and starving, but credit North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il—at least—with exquisite comic timing.

Last December, the world of East Asia and nuclear nonproliferation policy wonks was briefly abuzz over a *Foreign Affairs* article on North Korea by Selig S. Harrison. During the 1950s and 1960s, Harrison held a series of important, Asia-based foreign correspondent jobs for outfits like the Associated Press and the *Washington Post*. During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Harrison made an active second career for himself as a think-tank man on Eastern Hemispheric international relations topics. And during the present decade, Harrison has

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

CHRISTO TAKES ON SYRIA

made an active third career for himself frittering away whatever reputation he's got left from his first two times around.

Which is to say: Selig S. Harrison is to the Korean peninsula what Juan Cole is to the Middle East. He's the go-to guy if you're looking for someone, no matter what the specific situation, who's prepared to say that the Bush administration is screwing everything up—and lying about it, to boot.

That was the point of Harrison's *Foreign Affairs* piece, at any rate. The president and his State Department, Harrison argued at multi-thousand-word length, have been "seriously exaggerating the danger that Pyongyang is secretly making uranium-based nuclear weapons." In fact, it remains highly "unlikely that the country is able at present to build or operate the equipment needed, over a long period, to produce weapons-grade uranium."

This pronouncement—which implicitly indicted the Clinton administration, too, for "seriously exaggerating" North Korea's nuclear ambitions—inspired an exhaustive and devastating rebuttal from Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert L. Gallucci (Reiss was until recently the director of policy planning at State; Galluci was the Clinton administration's top North Korea negotiator). Selig Harrison could not be more wrong, the two men wrote for the forthcoming, March/April issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The case for North Korea's atomic weapons threat is "credible" and "dead to rights," Pyongyang having long since been caught "red handed."

But Harrison was unrepentant. "If it were as easy as Reiss [and] Galluci . . . argue it is to enrich uranium to weapons grade in quantities sufficient for nuclear weapons," Harrison sneered—in a reply made public simultaneously with the Reiss/Gallucci essay on February 8—"and if there were indeed credible evidence that North Korea has a program in place for doing so, one would have expected the Bush administration to put forward this evidence."

Barely 24 hours later, in the wee hours of February 10, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a formal statement confirming that Kim Jong Il's regime has "manufactured nukes for self-defense."

Ba-dum-bump. ♦

Breindel Award

Applications are invited for the seventh annual Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Journalism. The $10,000 prize is named for longtime *New York Post* editor and columnist (and WEEKLY STANDARD contributor) Eric Breindel, who died in 1998 at the age of 42. It is presented each year to the columnist, editorialist, or reporter whose work best reflects the spirit of Breindel's too-short career: love of country, concern for the preservation and integrity of democratic institutions, and resistance to the evils of totalitarianism.

Last year's winner was *Wall Street Journal* deputy editorial-page editor Daniel Paul Henninger. In 2003, the Breindel Award was presented posthumously to editor and columnist Michael Kelly, who'd been killed while on assignment in Iraq.

For further information about this year's Breindel Award, please contact Germaine Febles at 212-843-8031 or *gfebles@rubenstein.com*. ♦

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Casual

Café Society

I am New York City's foremost Starbucksologist. I know which Starbucks in Manhattan have a rectangular shape and which are curvilinear. I know which ones have their food displayed in horizontal cases with pastries at chest level and sandwiches down around your knees—and which have the floor-to-ceiling displays with pastries at eye level.

I know which have lots of tables and those that don't. I have learned which have their tables mostly by the windows—an important piece of information on a cold winter day because, believe me, if you sit right by the window, you will freeze your heinie off.

I never have the coffee, though. In my opinion, only a moron goes to Starbucks for the coffee—especially in New York City, where every corner deli sells a decent cup of java for 75 cents 24 hours a day.

I'm there for the Internet.

Starbucks made an astoundingly smart business move a few years ago by palling up with T-mobile to provide wireless Internet access in its stores. The access isn't cheap—$30 a month—but it's well worth the expense. I need the Net to do research while I write, and it's thrilling to have been freed from the tyranny of the home office. Ever since I began writing full-time, and ever since I bought a laptop with a wireless card in it, I have spent at least 20 hours a week inside a Starbucks.

There are a few other choices besides Starbucks for Internet use outside the home in New York. Bryant Park in Midtown, a popular hangout in warm weather, actually provides free online access, and the main branch of the New York Public Library (just east of Bryant Park) lets you log in there.

In my own neighborhood, there are 5 Starbucks in a 15-block radius, which means I can walk to one. And if I get antsy there, I can get up and walk to another. I am part of a small army of Starbucks post-industrial freelance workers—one of those people you see while you are waiting for your frappuccino, sitting at a little table, huddled over a computer, wearing headphones attached to an iPod to blot out the noise. (I'm listening either to Ella Fitzgerald sing the Duke Ellington songbook or Bob Marley's *Legend*.)



I do differ a bit from my fellow Starbucks scribes. First off, I am older than 24 (two decades older, alas) and don't have much hair left, compared with the hirsute gang that usually surrounds me. Second, I am not writing a screenplay. And finally, I am writing things that would make most of my fellow Manhattanites gag. Consider my life at Starbucks the twenty-first-century version of *Notes from the Underground*, as I dash off conservative polemics sitting next to the world's only remaining Marxists.

You have to admit there's something indefinably amusing about the fact that I finished the last chapter of my celebratory book *Bush Country* sitting amongst people who think Bush a war criminal. Half the clientele in the Starbucks at 93rd and Broadway last fall were wearing buttons with the word "Bush" and a big Ghostbusters slash through it.

I would smile at them. They would smile back, assuming I liked the button. After all, I look like any other Upper West Side guy. Unless the Bush-haters had caught me on Fox News at some point talking up Bush or talking down the Democrats—unlikely, given their angry feelings about Fox News—they could have no idea I was a double agent, doing my best with my iBook to discredit their views and contribute to the reelection of a president they hate with a lunatic passion.

I fear my days of passing as a Starbucks bohemian are coming to an end. We writers are getting crowded out. At my favorite Starbucks, on 86th and Columbus, I've noted with dismay that the tables are increasingly taken up by traveling salesmen and realtors, who settle themselves in with Palm Pilot, phone, computer, and notepad.

They, too, are freeing themselves from the tyranny of the desk, and, unlike me, they always have a huge cup of something complicated (nonfat decaf vanilla cappuccino with extra foam) sitting in front of them.

Still, I am outraged by this commercial intrusion into a sacred writing space. So what if they're willing to pay $5 for a bad cup of coffee? If the pencil pushers take over, where will the next generation write its unproduceable screenplays? And where will I, Upper West Side right-winger, go to subvert the politics of my neighbors in their full view?

Stop the capitalists, I say! Where's Michael Moore when you need him?

John Podhoretz

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Disraeli's Conservatism

David Gelernter's article on Benjamin Disraeli ("The Inventor of Modern Conservatism," Feb. 7) is superb. His understanding of the historical memory that infuses conservatism is exactly right. Likewise his grasp of Disraeli's enormous contribution in blending memory (the Burkean wing) with progress (in some ways a 19th-century innovation) and democratic populism (the inclusion of the whole nation and the concern for the whole nation—Tory Democracy) into one strong system of behavior. Gelernter's closing paragraphs capture what I describe as "patriotic education" in my new book, *Winning the Future*.

Years ago I spent time with former president Richard Nixon discussing Disraeli's contribution to modern thought. I think Gelernter captured it well.

Newt Gingrich
Washington, DC

David Gelernter's excellent article on Disraeli correctly contrasts him with Friedrich Nietzsche, but also overlooks the close intellectual and spiritual kinship between the two men. In one of Nietzsche's first English publications (*Thoughts out of Season*, 1909), editor Oscar Levy pointed out that the only author whose work could prepare the English-speaking public for Nietzsche was "a man whose politics you used to consider and whose writings you even now consider as fantastic, but who, like another fantast of his race, may possess the wonderful gift of resurrection, and come again to life amongst you . . . Benjamin Disraeli."

Both Nietzsche and Disraeli recognized the disastrous cloud of nihilism looming over Europe and fought against it. Disraeli's last, unfinished novel (available as an appendix in Monypenny and Buckle's Disraeli biography) prophetically describes a political movement whose only real function is to exterminate as many human beings as possible—an idea as fantastic to the Victorians as it is familiar to the survivors of the 20th century. But Disraeli's foresight does not stop there. The villains of this novel construct a social circle that is eerily indistinguishable from today's postmodern academic and political establishment.

Robert A. Harman
Kingston, NJ

Since Benjamin Disraeli has long been one of my favorite modern European historical figures, I have been disturbed by the lack of serious scholarship on his life and ideas. Perhaps David Gelernter's fine article will trigger a renewed academic interest in Lord Beaconsfield.

My only quibble is with Gelernter's characterization of Disraeli and religion. Gelernter presents Disraeli's strong embrace of Christianity as being a mistake. This is far too simplistic a view of a man so enthralled by the traditions of

Christianity as Disraeli, a man who counted St. Ignatius Loyola as one of his literary heroes. It also glosses over Disraeli's firm belief that Christianity was the natural and organic extension of Judaism.

As Disraeli biographer André Maurois writes in *Disraeli: A Picture of the Victorian Age*, "[Disraeli] did not understand how a Jew could not be a Christian; in his eyes that was to stop half-way and to renounce the glory of that race, which was that it had given the world a God."

Nevertheless, Gelernter's was an extremely insightful article on an oft-neglected individual.

Eric D. Thorner
Little Neck, NY

David Gelernter writes with admiration for Benjamin Disraeli. No doubt Disraeli was admirable in many ways. But his consistent opposition to repeal of the Corn Laws, which he saw as a means of preserving "the preponderance of the landed interest," likely increased the level of suffering and starvation in the Irish potato famine. (The potato famine began in 1845, the year before the Corn Laws were finally repealed.)

Disraeli clearly thought the landed gentry, in their paternalism, did a better job of caring for members of the laboring classes than workers, given the opportunity, could have done for themselves. But as economic history has shown, competition increases wealth and leads to more efficient use of resources. And as recent U.S. welfare reforms have demonstrated, treating the poor as adults can help lead them out of poverty.

Indeed, to believe that even people with few advantages can and will seize opportunities for self-improvement and wealth-building is a bedrock belief of American conservatism. To extol as an icon for modern conservatives someone who lacked insight into this aspect of human nature seems both strange and counterproductive.

Emily Rudd
Boulder, CO

How to Beat HIV/AIDS

Edward C. Green raised serious concerns about how committed the U.S. Agency for International Development is to the "A" and "B" components of the "ABC" (Abstain, Be faithful, or use a Condom) approach to AIDS prevention ("AIDS in Africa—a Betrayal," Jan. 31).

Over the last several years, USAID has conducted or sponsored much of the research that has documented the effectiveness of the ABC method. We at USAID have funded research by Green and others that played a key role in producing the international consensus that the ABC approach is essential to the prevention of HIV transmission in countries experiencing a generalized epidemic. In fact, Green was a major source for the seminal USAID publication "What Happened in Uganda?" This told the

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story of the decline of Ugandan HIV/AIDS prevalence from 15 percent in 1991 to 5 percent in 2001 due to the practice of ABC, and particularly the role of "A" and "B" in that success. As a result of the success in Uganda, President Bush's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief adopted ABC as the foundation of our own strategy. America is now spearheading this prevention strategy worldwide in collaboration with host governments.

The Ugandan government is very much committed to implementing an ABC approach, and USAID is supporting these efforts. Currently, USAID is working with First Lady Janet Museveni and the Ugandan Ministry of Education to implement abstinence education programs for youth. In 2004, USAID dispersed approximately $7.2 million in Uganda for interventions that promote abstinence and faithfulness, including a major initiative in schools that promotes abstinence and is championed by President Museveni. By comparison, USAID dispersed $4.8 million for programs that target condom promotion to high-risk groups and diagnose and treat sexually transmitted infections. USAID is also moving to bring in new partners to the war on HIV/AIDS, particularly in A and B behavior-change programs.

In the past four years, USAID has moved from a strategy that emphasized broad-based marketing of condoms to a more balanced approach that significantly strengthens and recognizes the special importance of A and B. Under the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, USAID and other U.S. agencies have been able to increase funding for programs that promote abstinence and faithfulness, with particular emphasis on abstinence for youth.

Recently, for instance, USAID announced 14 new, centrally funded grants for A and B programs totaling approximately $125 million over five years. Still, during this period of transition to a strong focus on A and B, there have been challenges and problems in fully implementing the change to a more balanced policy.

As the newly appointed acting assistant administrator for USAID's Bureau for Global Health, I am fully committed to promoting effective ABC programs in Uganda and elsewhere. I look forward to meeting with Green and other critics of our policy or its implementation. In February I traveled to Central Asia. In March I will travel to Africa (Uganda and Ethiopia) to assess how we are doing and to consider ways in which we can best implement a balanced ABC approach to HIV prevention.

The bottom line is, we share Green's deep commitment to Uganda's ABC strategy, and to using it worldwide.

KENT R. HILL
USAID Bureau for Global Health
Washington, DC

LONG AFTER MOST public health experts agreed that all three prongs of the "ABC" approach to HIV prevention are critical to success, Edward C. Green continues his anti-condom crusade.

Green insists that condom use has only a minor role to play in HIV prevention, and that promoting abstinence and fidelity are by themselves adequate strategies for those not already infected or in "high-risk" groups (such as prostitutes). But the data he cites belie his assertions. Green points to surveys suggesting that "more than half of African males and females between the ages of 15 and 19 are abstaining from premarital sex."

In other words, nearly half of unmarried African teenagers are not abstaining. To ignore the "C" in ABC is to withhold a critical weapon in the fight against HIV/AIDS from citizens of all ages, including young married couples who may wish to delay childbearing in addition to protecting themselves from sexually transmitted infections.

Along with Green and more than 140 leaders from around the world, I signed the consensus statement on HIV/AIDS published in the *Lancet*. Contrary to Green's characterization, the statement does not endorse the primacy of abstinence and monogamy in HIV prevention. Indeed, it recognizes that even as we promote "A" and "B," we must expand and improve condom use among those who are sexually active.

The AIDS epidemic must be faced head-on and addressed comprehensively. It's time to stop denigrating any of the three elements of the ABC strategy.

SHARON L. CAMP
Alan Guttmacher Institute
Washington, DC

WHILE WE DO NOT AGREE with Edward C. Green that the United States is overemphasizing the use of condoms in preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS, we share his concern about uneven implementation of the so-called ABC approach, which in itself is too narrow to effectively fight the pandemic.

Surprising as it may be to people like Green, international women's health organizations such as ours are deeply concerned that the Bush administration uses ABC as a mantra for its AIDS prevention efforts, but employs nothing more than rhetoric to promote fidelity. As the AIDS pandemic feminizes rapidly, women are at grave risk.

Neither abstinence nor condoms can protect women from unfaithful husbands, sexual coercion, or violence. Changing individual behavior and promoting faithfulness are fundamental to achieving the administration's goal of preventing 7 million new HIV infections. Correctly implemented, "B" programs can lead to individuals' valuing and respecting their partners—and faithfulness grows from that. Properly undertaken, efforts to encourage fewer sexual partners and the rejection of sexual violence and coercion will help slow the spread of HIV. In addition, parents learning to be faithful to their young daughters' rights—for example, keeping them in school and not marrying them off to much older men (who often have HIV)—should be part of the equation.

ADRIENNE GERMAIN
International Women's Health Coalition
New York, NY

IT IS A DIFFICULT TASK to challenge the many assertions made by Edward C. Green. Difficult *not* because he makes his case convincingly, but because paragraph after paragraph is constructed upon red herrings that almost make one think he has spent too much time in his Harvard ivory tower. Green presents viewpoints as facts, excludes the findings of others who have examined the Ugandan HIV/AIDS model, and assumes—in direct conflict with the research—that teaching abstinence along with other methods of disease prevention is incompatible.

For example, Green begins by outlining how Uganda's AIDS policy is founded on the now ubiquitous "ABC"

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approach, which Green contends means the "promotion of sexual abstinence and fidelity, with condoms promoted only quietly, to high-risk groups and those already infected." Let's be clear: The coining of ABC was and is a notion devised by Western researchers who set out to determine why Uganda was successful in stemming the spread of HIV. It was then, and remains now, a dumbed-down, after-the-fact formula that fails to capture the complex and vast response from every sector of Ugandan society.

Green also asserts that Uganda's AIDS program relegated condoms to the fringes of society. This simply is not true, but since Green insists that this was "an open secret" known by a select few—including Green himself—why don't we get all the secrets out on the table. Uganda's president and his erstwhile spouse (who is now a regular on the abstinence-until-marriage lecture circuit) only began parroting Green's—and President Bush's—slanted interpretation of ABC when it was clear that the Bush administration would look favorably upon such a stance. As Green says, Western donors like the United States "pay the bills" and "have a great deal of influence on national strategy," including HIV/AIDS.

We have an opportunity here. It is an opportunity for the billions of dollars spent by the U.S. government to make a real difference in the lives of millions of people. I'd like to believe Green feels similarly. But demonizing the good people working on behalf of our country in difficult circumstances overseas is not productive. Nor are the contrived and offensive assertions Green makes about the "hypersexed African that Western AIDS experts have been selling since the beginning of the AIDS pandemic."

Our good and moral response to the global HIV/AIDS pandemic deserves a more sophisticated level of debate.

WILLIAM SMITH
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States
Washington, DC

EDWARD C. GREEN RESPONDS: I am especially pleased to see Kent R. Hill's letter, and in fact I have already met with him. I am pleased to see his commitment to ensuring the full implementation of our government's "ABC" policy. I have worked in association with USAID for 25 years and have evaluated many of its programs. I could say a great deal about many of the good things they do, and the positive impact they've had. AIDS prevention has been problematic, however, and not just at USAID but almost everywhere, due to the model of prevention we were all working with.

I am a little suspicious of the statistics suggesting that more funds are now going to faithfulness-abstinence programs than to condom programs. There are many different ways to make these estimates. The actual cost of condoms is a very small part of programs that promote and distribute condoms. Moreover, there is condom promotion in programs officially classified as "voluntary counseling and testing," among others. But I don't wish to quibble with Hill. Instead, I am delighted with the offer to move forward to solve the problem, whatever its magnitude, and to keep lines of communication open with critics.

For the other writers, who think I am crusading against condoms, let me say that I understand your feelings. For many years I held your viewpoint (we have to defend condoms against all those crazy religious conservatives!). But let me put out a simple challenge: Can you find any study published in a peer-reviewed journal that suggests an increase in condom promotion has led to lower HIV infection rates *anywhere* in Africa? (I'm talking at the population level, not just among a high-risk subgroup such as those in commercial sex.)

This is a reasonable request, because condoms have represented the first line of defense for all Africans, not just those at high risk, such as those famously targeted in Bangkok. If you cannot produce a single study, then maybe Uganda's *original* approach of promoting fidelity and abstinence to most of the population, while targeting condoms to high-risk groups, is not such a crazy idea. It's hard to argue with success.

• • •

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A MESSAGE TO THE RIGHT-TO-LIFE MOVEMENT FROM NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA

PLEASE, HELP US PREVENT ABORTIONS

For years, your groups and ours have waged one of the country's most divisive political wars over a woman's right to choose. We believe passionately that women have the right to decide for themselves when to bring children into the world – without government interference. You disagree – passionately and sincerely.

We will never resolve our differences on this basic question. But we should agree on an equally fundamental point: America would be a better country if no woman ever faced the difficult choices posed by an unintended pregnancy. What better way to end the debate over abortion rights than by eliminating the reasons women seek abortion?

The time has come to join together in a new campaign to reduce the number of abortions.

Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid – who disagrees with us on the issue of abortion – has offered a commonsense bill called the *Prevention First Act* which would help reduce unintended pregnancies through better access to birth control. This landmark legislation represents a serious first step in addressing the problem, and I hope you'll join pro-choice Americans and me in offering your support.

Let's work together to pass this bill, and make it the first step in a dialogue about preventing unintended pregnancies.

I eagerly await your answer.

Nancy Keenan

Nancy Keenan
President
NARAL Pro-Choice America

NARAL
Pro-Choice America

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the weekly Standard

Time for National Private Radio

On the evening of February 10, the board of directors of WETA-FM, the only commercial-free classical music station in Washington, D.C., voted overwhelmingly to eliminate its music and arts programming. At the end of this month, someone will flick a switch and—*thud!*—WETA will fall to earth as just another all-news, all-talk station, and the nation's capital will be left without a public radio station devoted to beautiful and intelligent music.

WETA's transformation is a blow to the cultural life of the Washington metropolitan area, of course, which despite its succulent demographics in income and education levels has always struggled to maintain institutions that promote the fine arts. Yet our local station's fate should be of more than local interest. It confirms and will likely accelerate a trend already gaining momentum in public radio nationwide. A few days before WETA cheerfully announced its own death as a music station, WFDD in Winston-Salem, which has broadcast classical music to the North Carolina piedmont for more than 30 years, announced that it too was scrapping music in favor of all talk all the time. Together they join more than 50 public radio stations who in the last several years have given themselves up to news 'n' chat exclusively, leaving their music-loving audiences out of luck.

Something big is happening here, in other words, without fanfare, and with only token public deliberation. Public radio in the United States is remaking itself according to a wholly new sense of its mission. Originally conceived as a service for preserving and encouraging minority tastes ignored by the market—particularly in the arts, not only in classical music but also in jazz, bluegrass, cabaret, folk—public radio is being transformed into the nation's first government-funded news service. We would like to draw the attention of members of Congress to this sly conversion, and to its likely long-term effects. In the coming months congressmen will be sifting through the government's books in search of outlays that have outlived their usefulness. The $80-plus million now being spent to build a federally subsidized news organization, under the auspices of National Public Radio, would be a good place to start.

One comment, from WETA's president, Sharon Percy Rockefeller, struck us as revealing. "We're in the business of trying to create a larger audience," she told the *Washington Post*, explaining the board's decision. Her line of reasoning is shared by the new generation of station managers who have gained control over public radio in the last 15 years. According to their conventional wisdom—though whether it's wisdom or merely convention has yet to be determined—news and chat inevitably bring in more listeners, and more affluent listeners, than classical music or jazz. And affluent listeners draw higher-class advertisers (called "underwriters" in the painstaking lexicon of public broadcasting) and respond more generously during pledge drives.

Perhaps only students of public broadcasting will see the revolutionary nature of Mrs. Rockefeller's remark. For the point of subsidized radio has never been to maximize its audience, and certainly not to maximize its income. It has always been sustained instead on an odd, but sturdy, rationale: Public broadcasting needed to exist *because* its programming wasn't terribly popular. The dissemination of certain kinds of music and arts programming was a good in itself, and the government had an interest in roping off a part of the marketplace for its preservation. After all, if arts programming were sufficiently popular, the market would take it up—as the market has, for example, in the cataract of commercial talk and news stations flooding every region of the country, the very stations that public radio has now chosen to compete with. Pursue Mrs. Rockefeller's line of reasoning, on the other hand, and you're led quickly into absurdities: If a public radio station is in the "business" of drawing big audiences, why not fill its airwaves with Green Day or Alicia Keys and really pull 'em in?

Public radio hasn't sunk so low, not yet, and in fairness it probably won't. The present generation of public radio station managers take their market reasoning only so far, just to the point where it coincides (amazingly enough) with their own preferences in programming. As mostly white, affluent baby boomers, proud of their advanced educations and utterly ignorant of the arts, they share the tastes of the audience of doppelgängers they hope to

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attract: an indifference to forms of non-popular music and an endless appetite for chatter. We're disheartened to admit that the market strategy is working; these programmers may be tasteless but they aren't stupid. Today the public radio system has grown into a colossus of the American media landscape. NPR's two signature news shows, *Morning Edition* and *All Things Considered*, are the nation's second and third highest-rated nationally syndicated radio programs, after Rush Limbaugh. Several of its other shows, such as *Car Talk* and *A Prairie Home Companion*, routinely win their time slots in markets across the country. NPR has become, as its marketers like to say, a hugely successful brand, aimed straight at the nation's most affluent demographic cohort.

Congress has tried before to tamper with the subsidy to federally funded radio. The attempt stands as one of the signature failures of the fabled Republican-revolution-that-wasn't, away back there in the dreamy days following the election of 1994. "If the Corporation for Public Broadcasting still exists in two years," Newt Gingrich said then, referring to the government agency that funds public radio, "then we will have failed." Ten years later, Gingrich is gone but NPR survives, as one further indication of who really wears the pants in the great big family that is the federal government. A chief reason for the failure was the bureaucratic flow chart of public radio—a system of funding that would have puzzled Rube Goldberg. National Public Radio itself receives no direct subsidy from CPB; the money is instead laundered through local stations, who return the money to NPR in payment for the programs it produces. The intricacies and indirections of the system might lead a skeptic to think they were designed precisely to frustrate any congressional attempt at privatization.

But as our friends in the White House constantly remind us, we live in a transformational era—a time for trying the impossible. And public radio's continued success, measured in purely commercial terms, provides an excellent justification for removing the subsidy. Already the country is awash in news and talk and "informational programming." Is it fair to those commercial broadcast companies—who really are forced by the market to draw large audiences—to compete with government-subsidized stations aiming to fill the same market demand? Most public radio programmers are happy to boast of their success. Indeed, if you pump them with enough Chablis, they will even acknowledge that their strategy of eliminating arts programming has been so successful, and revenues to NPR's member stations have risen so high, that the $80 million in federal money is probably no longer essential to the system's survival.

Let's see if they're right.

—Andrew Ferguson, for the Editors

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Putin's Authoritarian Soul

The first big test for Bush's liberty doctrine.

BY JAMES M. GOLDGEIER & MICHAEL MCFAUL

IN HIS SECOND INAUGURAL address, George W. Bush made a full-throated, unabashed pledge to promote liberty throughout the world. Bush had barely stepped down from the podium, however, when "senior administration officials" began to caution that the president's speech did not signal a change in policy. Television talking heads and newspaper columnists joined the chorus of dismissal, arguing that words don't matter. The president, evidently, was simply performing an empty ceremony when he called for the spread of freedom.

Words by themselves, it is true, are never enough. To make his commitment credible, Bush must now execute a strategy for achieving his noble end. Yet words do matter, especially when spoken by the president of the United States. When chosen carefully and reiterated consistently, a president's words can be part of a strategy for promoting freedom. Autocrats around the world listen and get nervous. Democrats around the world listen and get inspired.

Words are especially meaningful when they are hard to say. The first big test of Bush's commitment to his liberty doctrine will come when he meets Russian president Vladimir Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, on February 24. Calling for freedom's advance on Inauguration Day is one thing; saying the same to Putin a month later is another, and a much more difficult, thing.

In previous meetings, Putin and Bush seem not to have spent much time discussing liberty. Before the recent inauguration, this omission had a strategic justification, however flawed. Throughout Bush's first term, "realists" on his team claimed that Russian-American relations were best served when we checked our values at the door. Our relations with Russia, so the argument went, were so important to our vital security interests that President Bush should avoid talking about freedom and democracy when meeting with his Kremlin counterpart and instead focus the dialogue on the global war on terror or nonproliferation.

This argument was shortsighted and flawed. In the long run—even in the medium run—coddling dictators backfires. Only a democratic Russia will be a reliable partner for either U.S. foreign policymakers or American businesses. Only a democratic Russia will be able to build a legitimate state capable of fighting terrorism on Russian soil and thereby contributing to the global war on terrorism. Only a democratic Russia will stop threatening young democracies nearby in Ukraine and Georgia.

But now, after Bush's speech, the "realist" argument for ignoring Putin's rollback of democratic practices in the name of national security interests can only undermine Bush's credibility. Bush made clear that he planned to promote liberty in every pocket of the world—surely including the largest country of all.

If Bush goes to Bratislava and fails to reiterate the sentiments of his inaugural address in public appearances with Putin, then the critics were right and authoritarian leaders everywhere can sleep easy. If the president neglects to affirm his commitment to freedom with Putin at his side, Bush will be signaling that his words don't count.

Bush cannot begin an effective campaign to spread liberty this way. In this pivotal first meeting of his second term with a faltering democrat, Bush has to let Putin know that he understands, and worries about, Russia's autocratic drift over the last several years. In fact, Russia is the only major country in the world to experience significant democratic backsliding during Bush's first term. Arguably, Russia's increasing authoritarianism is the greatest setback to the third wave of democratization since it began in Portugal in 1974. For a president committed to liberty's advance, these facts cannot be ignored. The truth has to be told in Bratislava.

Making democracy a focus of the Slovak summit, however, does not require Bush to sever ties with his friend Putin or downgrade other aspects of U.S.-Russian relations. Indeed, Bush might bone up on Ronald Reagan's second-term approach toward the Soviet Union and pursue a dual-track strategy, simultaneously engaging both the Russian state and Russian society. Paradoxical though it might seem, a more substantive agenda at the state-to-state level would create more permissive conditions for Western engagement of Russian society. This is precisely what happened in the 1980s, when Ronald Reagan offered the Soviet regime serious cooperation on strategic matters even as he stood up for America's democratic principles.

What can Bush offer Putin? The logical place for a grand new initiative is in the nuclear sphere, particularly an acceleration of the dismantling of nuclear weapons. A treaty that defined rules for counting warheads, specified a timetable for their dismantling, included robust verification procedures, made cuts in arsenals permanent, and did not allow demobilized weapons to be put in storage (as is

James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul are professors at George Washington University and Stanford University respectively and the authors of Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War.

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

Vladimir Putin

Thomas Fluharty

now the practice under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed in Moscow in 2002) would show not only the Russians but the rest of the world that the United States is serious about nonproliferation.

Second, Bush should push Congress to "graduate" Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 even before Russia joins the World Trade Organization. While some of the human rights problems that the amendment sought to correct by restricting the Soviet Union's trade status remain, Jackson-Vanik is an anachronism, strongly associated with the Soviet era; it does not address the new infringements of democratic norms, but simply grates on Russians, both officials and private citizens. At the same time, the administration can work with congressional leaders to initiate legislation to deal with new human rights abuses in Russia today and urge Congress to provide new resources to the Jackson Foundation, a nonprofit organization established with seed money from Congress to promote human rights and religious freedom in Russia.

Third, Bush must push Putin in areas important to the United States, including Russian support for the Iranian nuclear project and Russian meddling in the affairs of Georgia and Moldova.

When engaging Putin on this state-to-state agenda, there is no reason that Bush cannot also make the promotion of freedom inside Russia a central theme of the summit. If the summit has substance in other areas, it will be easier to introduce the "d" word.

In a one-day meeting, Bush is not going to be able to persuade Putin to end the war in Chechnya, stop using the law arbitrarily for political purposes, reconsider the decision to appoint previously elected governors, or ease up on the harassment of civil society leaders. But Bush must begin to convey why he and other democratic leaders see Russia's current political changes as cutting against the grain of democracy, a system of rule that reflects not only Western, but universal values.

Beyond the meeting in Bratislava, there are a number of steps President Bush can take to give his promotion of freedom in Russia credibility:

• Bush could praise the recent cease-fire announced by former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, and do everything in his power to strengthen the hand of those Chechens willing to negotiate with Moscow about Chechnya's sovereign status and weaken the jihadis fighting inside Chechnya, who care only about promoting Osama bin Laden's transnational agenda.

• Bush can stop requesting further cuts in the funds provided to Russia under the Freedom Support Act. Today, many American democracy-assistance organizations have bigger budgets for their work in Armenia than in Russia. The United States cannot abandon democratic activists in Russia now—before democracy has taken root. When Putin wields the power of the state to silence or marginalize political foes, Bush can stand in solidarity with those under attack.

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For instance, when Bush travels to Moscow next May, why not hold a public meeting with Russia's democratic forces in addition to the state-to-state meetings?

• Bush could put America's diplomatic weight behind the strengthening of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Putin wants to destroy this organization, in large measure for the instrumental role the OSCE has played in exposing electoral fraud in post-Communist states. As Russia approaches a critical set of elections in 2007 and 2008, a robust OSCE is needed more than ever.

• Bush could work with other leaders of the four-year-old Community of Democracies to downgrade Russia's status in the organization. Russia today is not a democracy. To invite it to attend the next meeting of the Community of Democracies in Santiago, Chile, in May of this year as a member in good standing would undermine the legitimacy of this body.

• Even if Putin does not listen to him at Bratislava or beyond, Bush can speak frankly about Russia's democratic erosion, if only so as not to harm Russia's democrats. In a recent interview, Bush said, "The American president can speak clearly and be mindful that certain activities can prop up tyrants and cause tyrants to have a legitimacy that they don't deserve." In his first term, Bush said he liked what he saw when he peered into Putin's soul, and he praised the Russian president for his democratic leanings—comments that bolstered Putin's legitimacy and weakened the cause of democrats in Russia and elsewhere.

Taken together, the steps outlined above can ensure that Bush in his second term—like Ronald Reagan in his—stands up for what he believes without disengaging from Russia on nuclear arms reduction, nonproliferation, or fighting terrorism. Mid-level bureaucrats always perceive tradeoffs between democracy-promotion and strategic cooperation. Bush has an opportunity to pursue both. ♦

Premature Engagement

We should be wary of embracing Indonesia's military before it reforms. BY ELLEN BORK

Military parade in Jakarta, October 6, 2004

Getty Images / Dimas Ardian

BUSH ADMINISTRATION officials want to upgrade ties with Indonesia's military. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has told Congress that the Indonesian military is cooperating in an investigation of the 2002 murders of two Americans and an Indonesian in Papua. This would clear the way to resume funding for a program called International Military Education Training (IMET), which was limited throughout the 1990s because of Indonesia's human rights violations, most recently following the 2002 murders (in which the Indonesian military may have been implicated).

Before renewing U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation, Congress will want to consider the history of the troubled relationship and ask whether America's association with an unreformed military in Indonesia will help or hurt democratic reform and civilian control there.

IMET funding was first cut off by Congress in response to the 1991 massacre of protesters in Indonesian-occupied East Timor. Despite this and other atrocities, officials of both Republican and Democratic administrations have consistently pushed for closer ties with the Indonesian military. Visiting Indonesia in the wake of the tsunami, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz (a former U.S. ambassador to Jakarta) implied that the current restriction is a bad idea: "Cutting off contact with Indonesian officers only makes the problem much worse."

In fact, some contact with the Indonesian military has been ongoing. Indonesian officers participate in counterterrorism fellowships at the National Defense University and in the U.S. Army's Theater Security Cooperation Program. Training in topics such as human rights and resource management is still available

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to Indonesian officers. Nonlethal military equipment for humanitarian purposes—like relief work after the tsunami—is also already available to Indonesia.

If full IMET is restored, other programs will likely follow, such as the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), which was halted by the Clinton administration after revelations that the Pentagon used it to circumvent the congressional ban on IMET funding. In reporting her 2003 book *The Mission*, the *Washington Post*'s Dana Priest found that 41 training exercises had been held with the Indonesian military between 1991 and 1998.

The emergence of Southeast Asia as an important front in the war on al Qaeda makes the closest possible relations with Indonesia's military more attractive to policymakers, who argue that engagement with unsavory military organizations can foster greater respect for human rights as well as valuable relationships.

But the evidence is not clear. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a retired general who won democratic election to the presidency in September, is cited by Wolfowitz as a distinguished graduate of IMET. However, in 1999, according to Priest, "U.S. officials were chagrined to learn that five of the 15 Indonesian military officers named by the country's human rights commission as allegedly involved in 'crimes against humanity' in East Timor were former IMET students."

As for closer relationships, as Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of Pacific forces, told Priest, "It is fairly rare that the personal relations made through an IMET course can come into play in resolving a future crisis." He also acknowledged that neither he nor his subordinates used their contacts to reach out to Indonesian military officers during the escalating militia violence in East Timor in 1999. To the contrary, the emphasis on good relations with the Indonesian military contributed to the U.S. decision to continue training operations with an elite special operations force even after officials concluded it was implicated in the kidnapping and torture of student activists during the fall of the Suharto regime.

Today Indonesia is a democracy. While it has exceeded expectations in some areas, military reform is not one of them. The State Department human rights report for 2003 refers to murder, rape, and torture by security forces and notes the promotion of retired and active military officers with records of serious abuses. Jakarta has held no members of the armed forces accountable for abuses in the 1999 violence in East Timor. As recently as last fall, the U.S. ambassador to Jakarta expressed regret that "we don't have the material with which to seriously go to Congress" to make the case for closer ties with Indonesia's military.

The tsunami and the widely admired response of the U.S. military have apparently changed the administration's position. But before any steps are taken, the administration should provide an accounting of past programs and their effectiveness in promoting reform, and outline a strategy that integrates military cooperation into a plan for advancing democracy and human rights in Indonesia.

International pressure has a proven record of helping, not hurting, reformers. If Indonesian president Bambang Yudhoyono is the model graduate of American training that Washington takes him to be, he will understand this. ♦

Michael Ramirez

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From Iron Curtain to Golden Arches

Fifteen years of Russian happy meals.

BY ARNOLD BEICHMAN

Opening day in Moscow, January 31, 1990

McDONALD'S IS CELEBRATING its 15th anniversary in Russia. Its sales have risen steadily, reaching $310 million in 2004. The company reports that it is serving more than 200,000 customers daily in more than a hundred Russian locations. Well, three cheers for McDonald's, but what's the big deal?

Why is McDonald's such a success when all they're selling is a Russian staple, a *kotlety* as they call it? It was once a puzzle to me, but there's a story behind this McDonald's success story.

Some years ago I was staying at one of Moscow's most luxurious hotels, just built by private German investors, called the Mezhdunarodnaya (International). A beautiful lobby, sumptuous furnishings, and, for the interested, lovely ladies circulating about. And high above the lobby was some kind of huge cuckoo clock which yapped out the time, while little dummy creatures marched round and round and then shut themselves down.

I was a member of a group tour organized by the World Media Association to interview leading Soviet political personalities. We were asked to take our lunches in the hotel dining room, where one could conduct private conversations without concern that you would be overheard because the tables were suitably separated. You didn't order lunch. It was a fixed menu, dish after dish, five courses—soup, main course, salad, dessert, and beverage.

Another member of our group was the distinguished scholar of Russian history Richard Pipes, at present a Harvard professor emeritus. While Professor Pipes is a relaxed observer of Jewish laws of *kashruth*, he is careful about what he eats. He does not eat anything to do with pigs. So when the waiter plopped down—literally—two plates with a gray-looking meat slab, Pipes inquired of the waiter, in Russian:

"What meat is this?"

"*Ya niznayu*, I don't know," snapped the waiter with a shrug and walked off.

Fast forward to 1991. I am in a taxicab heading to downtown Moscow with a Russian friend. We pass one of the first McDonald's outlets, and there's a line around the block. And so I ask my Russian friend, Why is there such a line for McDonald's when all that's being served is the *kotlety*? He explained:

First, no tipping.

Second, service is almost instantaneous.

Third, it's American, so the hamburgers can be trusted.

Fourth, terrific French fries.

But the most important reason was the fifth: When the customer forked over his rubles, the cashier said, and with a smile: *Spasibo*. Thank you. There was no tossing the food at the customer as was the case at the fancy-schmancy Hotel Mezhdunarodnaya. Courteous service was something unheard of in the Soviet days and during the *perestroika* transition to capitalism.

Today Russia is McDonald's fifth most profitable market in Europe after Britain, France, Germany, and Spain. The company now employs 17,000 people in Russia and operates 127 restaurants in 37 cities west of the Urals.

The first McDonald's opened in Moscow's Pushkin Square in 1990. A record 30,000 people lined up for blocks to get in on its first day of business. And all that was being sold, at a price almost equivalent to a day's wages, was a *kotlety*. But ah, the French fries. Or as they call it in Russian, "*kartofel fri*," served with a smile. ♦

Arnold Beichman, a Hoover Institution research fellow, is a columnist for the Washington Times.

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A Swedish Dilemma

Immigration and the welfare state

By Christopher Caldwell

Malmö, Sweden

"*Everyone* is welcome here," says Bejzat Becirov to a non-Muslim visitor. Becirov runs the Islamic Center of Malmö, on the outskirts of Sweden's third-largest city. When Becirov immigrated from his native Macedonia in 1962, Swedes used to say that kind of thing, too. But in the last two decades, Malmö has acquired a population that is almost 40 percent foreign. Most of the students in its public schools are of foreign parentage. Some immigrant neighborhoods in the city have (official) unemployment rates exceeding 50 percent. Malmö's mayor, Ilmar Reepalu, has pleaded for immigrants to be settled in other parts of Sweden. This has made Reepalu popular in Malmö, but not in those other parts of Sweden. Others uneasy about immigration are too impatient to work through official channels. Much of the Islamic Center was destroyed by a fire of suspicious origin in 2003.

Becirov founded the center in 1964. The squat mosque, recently renovated, with two minarets, was built in 1984. That makes it among the oldest of the hundreds of mosques that now dot Scandinavia. This is a place that can raise great hopes or great worries, depending on how one views it. The center has a bustling school of a dozen classrooms. Becirov is an avuncular and open-hearted man, and the hundreds of students at the school dote on him. They run up and hug him, they tell him jokes. The teachers are dedicated, mostly native Swedes, who are teaching the children both Swedish and English. There is also a teacher of Arabic and the Koran. There is a clinic that treats sick kids, circumcises baby boys, and gives psychiatric counseling to war-traumatized children.

The center is on the edge of Rosengård, an archipelago of housing projects southeast of Malmö. It is one of the poorest, most transient, and welfare-dependent neighborhoods in Sweden. Swedish authorities have failed to lift up the area, and seem to be giving the Islamic Center of Malmö a great deal of leeway in attempting to do so. An article that appeared in 2003 noted that "a few" of the 6- to 10-year-old girls were wearing headscarves. On a visit in January 2005, fully 80 percent were covered in class—only a handful were not.

Malmö is the city in Sweden most touched by immigration—but it's not unique. In a fit of absent-mindedness, Sweden has suddenly become as heavily populated by minorities as any country in Europe. Of 9 million Swedes, roughly 1,080,000 are foreign-born. There are between 800,000 and 900,000 children of immigrants, between 60,000 and 100,000 illegal immigrants, and 40,000 more asylum-seekers awaiting clearance. The percentage of foreign-born is roughly equivalent to the highest percentage of immigrants the United States ever had in its history (on the eve of World War I). But there are two big differences. First is that, given the age distribution of the native and foreign populations, the percentage of immigrants' offspring will skyrocket in the next generation, even if not a single new immigrant arrives, and even if immigrant fertility rates fall to native-born levels. But second, when America had the same percentage of foreign-born, many had arrived decades before, and were largely assimilated.

Modern Sweden has built its sense of identity on two pillars: its generous welfare state and its status as what Social Democrats used to proudly call a "moral superpower." (Non-Social Democrats still use the term, mockingly.) Indications are that the latter achievement is in the process of destroying the former.

Part of Sweden's sense of moral worthiness has been earned. It derives from a straightforward impulse to charity. One reads in European papers, for instance, that Henning Mankell, one of the world's most popular authors of

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detective novels, spends much of his time working to fight AIDS and illiteracy in Mozambique. But Sweden's moral engagement has been tinged at times with a provincial sense of national superiority. The Social Democrat Olof Palme hitched his political career to the anti-Vietnam war movement in Europe and spent the rest of his life scolding anti-Communists; in 1982, he invented the trope of accusing Israelis of treating Palestinians exactly as Nazis had treated Jews. Palme managed to lead the country for 12 of 17 years—until he was murdered on a Stockholm shopping street in 1986—without ever once getting invited to the White House. Sweden ranked high, in a notorious 2003 Eurobarometer poll, among those naming the United States and Israel as the major threats to world peace.

But it is not as if European countries fare much better in Sweden's estimation. Swedes voted by a narrow margin to enter the European Union in a 1994 referendum held in in the wake of a devastating recession. But Swedes have been unwilling to surrender their currency for the euro. And many of the arguments of the anti-Europe campaign are staples of the Swedish mindset: the notion that Europe is backward, hidebound, conservative, Catholic, the kind of place that forces women to be housewives. (One ad for the No-to-the-euro campaign showed a woman slaving over her husband's dinner and asked, "Is the E.U. a women's trap?")

Toward the end of the Social Democratic reign that ran uninterrupted from 1932 to 1976, Sweden not only ranked among the world's handful of richest countries but also provided the world's most lavish welfare state. It married solidarity to prosperity. In the prevailing Keynesian climate, Swedes assumed that the solidarity *created* the prosperity. The state was generous with workers, who spent their money and kept the economy pumped up. Today, people are inclined to think the causality runs in the other direction. Johan Norberg, the young new-economy guru of Timbro Institute in Stockholm, notes that if Sweden were somehow to leave the E.U. and join the United States, "we would be the poorest state in America."

An entire revisionist history of the past hundred years of Swedish economics and politics is beginning to emerge from the work of Norberg and others. Sweden misjudged its strengths. Chief among these was that, for most of the last century, Sweden was the least protectionist country in the world. Private companies had to fend for themselves, without subsidies or tariffs. The result was an entrepreneurial energy unequalled anywhere. Saab cars ran, and Electrolux vacuum cleaners whined, on all continents. This extraordinary business acumen persists today in Ikea, Absolut vodka, H&M retailers, and the Metro newspapers that are the most widely circulated in the world.

The welfare state that premier Per Albin Hansson brought, starting in 1932, was mythologized as *folkhemmet*—"the people's home"—which plainly reflected an idea of the Swedes as a *folk*. In a 1935 essay, Hansson rejected the predominance of class concerns. "There is something much more exciting," he wrote, "about the thought that we are fighting for the *folk*. To such an appeal everyone will listen; in the coming together of the *folk* most of us want to be a part." It was World War II that forced the discomfiting question of whether the Swedes could be organized socialistically on any other basis. Sweden was neutral in the war, but neutral in the German sphere of influence. Germans used Swedish railways, bought Swedish mines, and built weaponry with Swedish iron. The Allies considered bombing Sweden.

Swedish neutrality did two things. First, it left nagging questions among Swedes about whether their country had engaged in a passive collaboration. This spurred an expiatory generosity towards the Third World, a "building of bridges between North and South," an anti-racism that would be a hallmark of Swedish foreign policy thereafter. But it also left Sweden in an enviable economic situation. Sweden had boomed during the war, and the arms manufactures in which it concentrated turned out to be adaptable to peacetime use. Now it had the only intact heavy-industrial base in all of Europe. The country could mint money if only it could find the labor. Finns arrived in droves, and when they proved insufficient to the country's needs, employers began recruiting in Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece. This import of laborers stopped in the 1970s.

In the mid-1960s, Sweden declared it was short of houses and announced an ambitious plan to build 1,000,000 units of housing in the following decade. The country succeeded in its so-called "Million Program," but harvested all manner of unintended consequences. For a decade, resources were shifted, through dramatic tax hikes, from private businesses to public-sector engineers and masons and pavers. The Million Program was the Socialists' White Whale, the preoccupation that sucked up all of the country's resources—much as integration of immigrants will be in the coming decades. Architecturally, the Million Program gave a soulless, sterile cast to a socialism that had hitherto been anything but. But the biggest problem with all these high-rises was that Swedes—unlike, say, Parisians, but very much like Americans—prefer not to live in apartments. When, in 1982, Sweden passed a reform very similar to the American mortgage-interest tax deduction, the incentives were in place for a massive flight from the Million Project. A

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decade later, these half-decent apartments standing empty would exert a mighty pull on immigrants from the world's trouble spots. This, along with a generous welfare system, helps explain the otherwise puzzling coincidence of Malmö's becoming a magnet for immigrants at the very height of the early-1990s recession, when the city lost a third of its job base.

The Rosengård housing project had turned into a problem almost as soon as it was built. Already in the early 1970s, an exposé called *The Case of Rosengård* was published in which the project's failure was chalked up to errors of scale. The big, impersonal three- and eight-story apartment complexes were plopped down in the middle of empty fields around a farmhouse that still sits incongruously in the middle of them. There were no cozy, intermediate spaces between inside and outside—between being trapped in a tiny apartment and stranded in a desolate flatland. Today the windblown courtyards, much enhanced by shrubbery, playground equipment, convenience stores, and halal butchers, are filled with heavily veiled women pushing baby carriages. Almost all of the women in Rosengård—who mostly come from Somalia, Morocco, Iraq, and the Kurdish areas of Turkey—go heavily covered. The men drink coffee in the shopping center attached to the housing project, which has a pleasingly Turkish aspect.

Rosengård appears to be all-immigrant. The public schools have virtually no ethnically Swedish children. There are stories—familiar in other parts of Europe where immigrants from the Muslim world have recently settled—of students harassing Jewish teachers and defacing textbooks that treat Jewish themes. Crime is high. Drug use—curiously—is low.

Kent Andersson, Malmö's deputy mayor for integration and the labor market, likes to say that his city has become Sweden's most modern, and not just because of the magnificent new 10-mile-long Öresund bridge that links the city to Denmark just across the Baltic Sea. He notes that Malmö and Copenhagen share the most densely populated corner of Scandinavia. They have important universities. Malmö has made the transition from an industrial economy (shipbuilding, cigarette-making, and machinery) to an information economy (education, services, and welfare). A couple of decades ago, half the population worked in the city's mills and docks; only 15 percent do today. Instead, the municipal government, with 20,000 employees, is the largest employer. Andersson pulls out a pile of statistics to show that, right now, Malmö is at about the Swedish average in population aged 20-34. But in 2015, it will have 28 percent more people in that age group than the rest of the country. Andersson is excited about the purchasing power that represents. He thinks employers will be excited by the size of the work force.



Rob Schoenbaum / Polaris for The Weekly Standard

Midday prayer at the Stockholm mosque, February 16, 2005

"Of course," he adds, "different people will look at these statistics and see different things."

Not all of these things are necessarily threatening. It is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, cultural shifts (like the presence of a mammoth mosque that stands across from the ice-

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skating rink in Medborgar Square, smack in the middle of southern Stockholm, or Bejzat Becirov's Islamic Center, or the "Rosengård Swedish" that linguists detect among the urban newcomers, from which the sing-songy, heep-de-deep-de-doo intonations of the language have been purged), and civilizational outrages on the other. The latter include the dispiritingly steady stream of "honor-killings" that occur among the country's immigrants, most of them committed by Kurds. These have generally involved girls executed by their brothers or fathers for wearing short skirts or dating Swedish men. Stockholm and Malmö both have a number of safe houses, of the sort that have long existed for the wives and companions of violent men, but which are now mostly inhabited by Muslim women fearing honor killings or domestic violence.

But in a country where, as the sociologist Åke Daun puts it, "people like being *like* each other," there is evidence of profound exhaustion with immigration, whether the reasons for this exhaustion are rationally well-founded or not. In the moral-superpower context, it is the equivalent of "imperial overstretch." Swedes tell pollsters they want no more asylum-seekers. (A common complaint is that prospective arrivals have figured out how to "game" the rules of asylum applications, and that the best way to render one's story unchallengeable under the law is to destroy one's identity papers.) A very low rate of mixed marriage is an indication that Swedes may not have been crazy about this immigration in the first place.

There are some signs of integration—Sweden has an Assyrian Christian minister of schools; the soccer star Zlatan Ibrahimovic, born in Rosengård to Bosnian Croat parents, is a national hero. But one much more often hears stories of increasing segregation. One actually hears the word "segregation" used. A person who stuck to central Stockholm would find none of the clues of heavy minority presence that a visitor to central Amsterdam or Paris or London gets. "Sweden is a special country," says Nalin Pekgul, director of the Social Democrats' women's group in Stockholm. "It wasn't a colonial power—it had no experience with immigrants."

"Many of us," says Masoud Kamali, an Iranian-born professor of ethnic studies at the University of Uppsala, "saw Sweden as the homeland of tolerance, solidarity, and democracy, based on the image of Sweden abroad." Yet foreigners find that the longer they live in Sweden, the more foreign they feel. Kamali, who directs studies on xenophobia and social exclusion for both the E.U. and the Swedish government, says, "Integration is a complete failure: No one can deny it." Kamali, a radical and controversial figure, speculates that a fear of getting segregated out of the society may be the reason that immigrants have shown themselves overwhelmingly in favor of European Union membership, both at the ballot box and in opinion polls. "They think: 'You are not going to be a Swede—or, at least, it's not you who's going to decide if you are a Swede.' But perhaps you can choose to be a European."

Swedes have lately grown attentive to their neighbors' policies on immigration. They note that Finland's tight immigration policies have resulted in lower social burdens. But ever since the Öresund bridge brought Malmö within commuting distance of Copenhagen, it is to Denmark that Swedes have looked with most anxiety. There, the rise of the anti-immigration Danish People's party—which has never entered government but has thoroughly spooked the other parties of left and right—has succeeded in winning passage of Europe's most stringent laws on immigration. Denmark now restricts asylum admissions, welfare payments, and citizenship and residency permits for reasons of family unification. Danes under 25 who marry foreigners no longer have the right to bring their spouses into the country. Many such half-Danish couples now live in Malmö.

Denmark's crackdown has left Swedes wondering what is to stop *everyone* in the E.U. from coming to the most generous welfare state, even if such worries are couched in human-rights language. Shortly after Denmark passed these laws in 2002, Sweden's Social Democratic integration minister complained that the policies were inhumane. The Danish People's party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, replied to the Swedes in a newsletter: "If they want to turn Stockholm, Göteborg, and Malmö into Scandinavian versions of Beirut . . . then that is up to them." It would be surprising if the way the E.U. is organized did not produce a "race to the bottom"—the same dynamic that leads American states to try to undercut one another on social programs for fear of becoming welfare magnets.

Sweden does not (yet) have a populist party like Denmark's, but there is a sense among Swedes that the country is open to (or vulnerable to) some kind of political experimentation. You can see this in the success of the brand-new "June list" party in last year's European elections, in the decision of the leftist member of parliament Gudrun Schyman to start her own feminist party, and in the reform impulses of the ruling Socialists themselves.

It is easy to lay out horror stories about socialism run amok in the hands of the Swedish left. The state now spends three times as much on sick leave and early retirement for workers as it does on national defense. But the present Socialist prime minister, Goran Persson, has reform credentials as good as his party offers. As finance

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minister in the 1990s, Persson was considered a member of the center-left-but-runs-a-tight-ship coterie that included Robert Rubin in the United States, Dominique Strauss-Kahn in France, and Gordon Brown in Britain. Sweden has actually implemented two large pieces of George W. Bush's agenda, at which Americans have thus far balked: (partially) privatized social security and (thoroughly) voucherized schools. Persson has continued these programs.

One of the most interesting new-style politicians in Sweden is Mauricio Rojas, who long taught economic history at the University of Lund, and emerged as an important voice in the small, free-market Liberal party in the last election. He arrived in Sweden in 1974, in his early twenties, along with many other leftist refugees from the regime of Augusto Pinochet. Such Chileans had a certain chic when they arrived in Sweden. They were animate evidence of American insensitivity and Swedish virtue. They were also highly politicized and smart, and those who did not return to Chile after the departure of Pinochet have made their mark on Swedish politics. Rojas has since become a thoroughly assimilated Swede—he quotes liberally from its literature and folklore and can rattle off stories about Per Albin Hansson the way a Louisianan would tell stories about Huey Long—and he has moved steadily to the right on economic matters. There is one area, though, in which Rojas heartily agrees with Nalin Pekgul and Masoud Kamali: There is white flight in Sweden, with the natives very actively segregating themselves from the foreigners. "The areas that we *call* 'segregated' are actually very mixed," he says. "The segregated part of the country is the Swedish part."

The way to attack that, Rojas thinks, is by making sure immigrants have something to offer to the wider society, and that something is what everyone ought to offer: work. Rojas despairs at the high levels of unemployment in immigrant areas—in December he completed a nationwide study that showed 136 areas where labor market participation was under 60 percent—and wants to remove certain of the subsidies that make such conditions possible. "No one is going to live here without working," he said. "I told immigrant groups, 'If we come to power, seven o'clock Monday morning, it's off to work.'" His Liberal party also urged Swedish-language tests for foreigners. In the last days of last year's campaign, the Liberals' share of the vote shot from 4 percent to 13 percent.

Luciano Astudillo, a 32-year-old Chilean-born Social Democrat who represents Malmö in parliament, has known Rojas all his life. "He and I both see how diversity is affecting the welfare state," says Astudillo. "We both see that it's a challenge." Astudillo's plan of attack is more community-based. It includes advice to immigrants on



Rob Schoenbaum / Polaris for The Weekly Standard

A student at the government's free Swedish classes, in Solna

how to start companies, cooperation with organizations such as the Malmö Islamic Center, and the development of programs with a Turkish-Swedish soccer team called MABI—the Scandinavian equivalent of midnight basketball. "I don't think there's a clash between solidarity and diversity," he says.

The economic historian Rojas begs to differ. "High levels of taxation require that the people taxed be a community," he says. "And this has for a long time been a tribal society. . . . A *good* tribe! Very peaceful and nice! But a tribe." ♦

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Bush's Grand Tour

How to reach out to the Europeans—and how not to.

By Gerard Baker

It's Hug-a-European Month for American foreign policy. First Condoleezza Rice inaugurates her tenure at the State Department with a grand tour of Europe's capitals. She wears tweed in London, speaks multilateralist in Paris, and from Brussels to Berlin dispenses erudite grace and scented bonhomie to once skeptical audiences.

Then last weekend, hot on Rice's elegant heels, and with no less enthusiasm, Donald Rumsfeld undertakes his own friendship initiative. At the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, a venue he has used in the past to inflame European sensitivities, Rummy comes as close as his temperament and disposition will allow to being charming. What he lacks in Condi's mellifluous style, he makes up for in a bit of unaccustomed self-deprecation, telling his audience he is no longer Old Rumsfeld but a new model, one that dearly values the enduring ties that bind America and Europe.

All this activity is mere prologue, of course, to the main event. This week, President Bush will travel overseas for the first time since his re-inauguration, with symbolic stops in Brussels, for diplomatic dinners at the European Union and NATO, Germany, where he will praise transatlantic unity in a set-piece speech, and Slovakia, where he will meet Russian president Vladimir Putin.

You would have to be insensate to miss the meaning of all these semiotics. Message: We care, as the president's father might have put it. After four years in which the Bush administration has reached out to most of Europe with a single, raised middle finger, it has begun its second term with a smothering embrace.

Conscious that a sullen and hostile Europe is not in America's best interests, and eager to enlist even reluctant allies in the global struggle for liberty, the Bush team has decided to do all it can to mend fences. It won't compromise on its priorities, of course, but beyond that it will try to foster a productive relationship.

Other than the symbolism, what does all this diplomatic outreach mean? And how will Europeans respond? Can Europe be coaxed back into an alliance that will help the United States pursue its broader strategic aims?

There is a danger, in my view, that the Bush administration, in its newfound eagerness to show its kinder, less Martian, more Venusian side, will actually create bigger problems for itself. In its efforts to be diplomatically accommodating, the United States may end up supporting and bolstering a vision of Europe that is directly at odds with long-term U.S. goals and interests. Nothing is to be gained by unnecessarily antagonizing Europeans, to be sure, and the United States is right to pursue ways of cooperating. But if the early signs of the new détente are any guide, the Bush administration may find itself walking into a trap.

Since Bush's reelection last November, there have been welcome signs on both sides of the Atlantic of a willingness to bury hatchets. And this convergence of good will has been helped along by several events outside either party's control.

For starters, President Bush himself seems eager to reengage. The day after his reelection, he spoke with European leaders, including the once-despised Gerhard Schröder in Berlin, and emphasized his willingness to start afresh.

Rice's transition to State was accompanied by some other personnel moves that looked like conciliatory gestures in European eyes—the nomination of the European expert Robert Zoellick as the number two, most notably.

Europeans, too, have appeared more interested in holding up their side of this fragile but grand alliance. The successful elections in Iraq last month have been greeted with some softening in hostility to the U.S.-led war. A number of governments that had shunned the initial coalition—France and Germany, notably—have now pledged to increase their contribution to the stabilization effort with money for debt relief and even some limited military assistance for the training of Iraqi forces.

More important to this cautious rapprochement than anything either side has done or said have been the effects of outside events. The death of Yasser Arafat has created an opening in the Middle East that was unimaginable while the old terrorist was a figure of sympathy in most of

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Europe. That both sides can now sit down with a Palestinian leader they trust is bound to produce more common ground than has existed in the last four years. The Ukraine election—at least in its second go-around—provided a concrete example to back up the abstract bromide that Americans and Europeans share the same values. We can all unite against the ballot-riggers and the opponent-poisoners and rejoice when these tyrants fail. And the Indian Ocean tsunami concentrated minds on both sides of the Atlantic on the unique capabilities wealthy countries share to relieve suffering in benighted parts of the world.

President Bush will seek to build on all this when he visits next week. He will promise closer cooperation and may even signal some U.S. movement on contentious issues such as Middle East peace and global warming. Yet hard challenges have made a mockery of friendly gestures and warm rhetoric in the past. And there are plenty of reasons besides to think that these latest good intentions will go the way of previous ones.

Iran remains a flashpoint. Europeans simply acknowledge no alternative to their carrots-only approach of encouraging Tehran into nuclear concessions. They certainly don't share the administration's view, properly and firmly restated by Rice in one of the few evidently discordant moments of her trip, that Iran is simply not to be trusted. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, insisted in Munich that, despite all evidence to the contrary, there is a real chance the Iranians will agree to disarmament.

Europeans simply acknowledge no alternative to their carrots-only approach of encouraging Tehran into nuclear concessions.

Then there is the E.U.'s imminent decision to lift its embargo on arms sales to China, in place since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. The Europeans are currently engaged in increasingly comical efforts to justify the move—the latest being the claim that lifting the embargo is actually the only way to ensure China doesn't get the technology it wants. This nonsense only shows how determined Europe is to sell China arms again.

But the major point of contention remains Iraq, and the broader strategy it represents, of democratic transformation in the Muslim world. Behind Europe's offers of limited support lies deep skepticism about the whole effort. In Paris, Berlin, and Brussels, there is still an undiminished conviction that the war was a colossal and immoral error that will result in turmoil and suffering for all concerned. On February 14, after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister, while the Unites States was fingering Syria and recalling its ambassador, the European Union was insisting there was no need for a change in its diplomatic relations with Damascus.

These differences are not just awkward, inconvenient blots on an otherwise pleasant landscape of Atlantic unity. They are great, ugly cleavages in basic perceptions, strategy, and policy. The Bush administration remains committed to revolutionary change throughout the world and, just as the Reagan administration did, believes America's security is inextricably tied up with the advance of liberty well beyond its borders. Europeans, meanwhile, are ever more staunch in their defense of the status quo, however unfree that may leave people. Stability, not liberty, is their aim.

These differing perceptions are familiar enough now, of course. What is new is a growing commitment by the leaders of Europe to implement a global strategy that will actively block the United States from pursuing its goal of combating tyranny.

Specifically, the European Union is now being driven steadily toward a global role that would counterbalance what the principal architects of European policy, Jacques Chirac especially, see as the pernicious influence of U.S. power.

How striking that, in 2005, the most controversial issues in the U.S.-European relationship derive from European initiatives, not American. The diplomatic outreach to Iran by the Big Three of Europe—France, Germany, and Britain—has put the more strenuous U.S. approach on hold for the time being.

The China gambit is a naked attempt, led by the French, to foster a stronger relationship between Brussels and Beijing, to the mutual benefit of both of these alternative poles to U.S. power. But to really inaugurate this shift to a multipolar world, the E.U.'s leaders still need to overcome internal dissent and the naturally fissiparous tendencies of European nation-states. So European governments and political elites are pressing ahead with their integration project. The process of adopting a new constitution for Europe is well underway in all 25 states, a process that will significantly strengthen Europe's institutional arrangements, enabling it to develop a single voice in global affairs, while suppressing alternative approaches favored by individual states.

The other element of this strategy is to undermine the Atlantic institution in which both the United States and its natural allies in Europe—the Eastern European countries, Britain, and a few other Atlanticist nations—have real

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clout: NATO. If France, Germany, and company can reduce NATO to a museum piece and replace it with a strategic partnership of "equals," between the United States and the European Union, they will significantly strengthen Europe's ability to act as a counterweight to U.S. power.

This aim is now quite explicit—let rather clumsily out of the bag by Chancellor Schröder in Munich last week. In a speech read for him by his defense minister, the chancellor said NATO was no longer the main location for discussion of strategic transatlantic questions. The speech then called for a panel of experts to draw up proposals for a new transatlantic architecture. Though officials tried to deny it afterwards in hastily arranged briefings, Schröder's meaning was clear: Goodbye NATO, hello U.S.-E.U. dialogue.

Instead of politely resisting this crude attempt to change the rules of transatlantic diplomacy, as it has done for the last twenty years, the United States now seems to be encouraging it. On her trip to Europe this month, Secretary of State Rice was positively enthusiastic about the E.U. constitution and the unified foreign policy institutions it will produce:

"As Europe unifies further . . . and has a common foreign policy, I understand what is going to happen with the constitution, and that there will be the unification under, in effect, a foreign minister. I think that will also be a very good development," she told reporters in Luxembourg.

Not only was this an oddly undiplomatic intervention in a clearly contentious internal European matter (at least a dozen countries are holding referendums on the constitution, and the outcome is in serious doubt in at least three). It seemed a straight surrender to a European strategy that is designed not to help the United States in the long run.

To be fair, the administration's mind doesn't yet seem made up on this. At the Munich conference, invited to repeat Rice's endorsement, Donald Rumsfeld gently declined. Later, responding to questions about the changing transatlantic landscape, he said, archly: "Condi Rice doesn't have a policy. The president of the United States and the United States have policies. . . ."

In the endless theorizing about the transatlantic relationship, it is tempting to dismiss Europe as irrelevant, a nineteenth-century superpower in a 21st-century world.

Its sclerotic economy, stagnant demography, military obsolescence, and strategic pusillanimity create the impression of a gently disintegrating, mildly irritating, but mostly inconsequential relic. The dogs of Europe may bark, but America's caravan is moving on to the Middle East and Asia Pacific.

Such a dismissal would be foolish and shortsighted. Europe retains its potential to undermine U.S. goals. As its current strategies over Iran and China demonstrate, even a weak and divided E.U. can, as the Lilliputians did to Gulliver, complicate America's freedom of maneuver. A single, unified European approach would only make things worse.

It would be a mistake for the Unites States to actively encourage a European Union that sees itself as a growing counterweight to, not a partner of, the United States. That doesn't mean the United States needs to inaugurate another phase of mutual transatlantic mistrust. Nobody wants to replay the last four years.

But instead, and without rancor, President Bush should continue to make the case for his ideal of freedom and for policies designed to bring it about. Persuading the E.U. as an institution to join this cause is probably hopeless; but persuading ordinary Europeans is not. When Bush spoke in Britain in November 2003 and spelled out his foreign policy vision, Britain was at the peak of anti-American sentiment. But the message, undistorted by the usual hostile media prism, went over well. The Iraqi elections last month were a further important step in winning over the persuadable parts of European public opinion.

Not all Europeans are immune to the case for U.S. leadership. They remember that we had a multipolar world between 1917 and 1989. It might have been wonderful for certain political elites, but the broader mass of humanity was the loser.

The Bush administration could also encourage its friends all over Europe, who don't want to see their continent become a brake on America's drive for freedom. Political support, through stronger practical ties and material assistance from the Republican party to conservatives across Europe, would be widely welcomed.

Above all, the United States should seek ways to strengthen and renew NATO. It should resist the calls of European superpower dreamers (and their supporters in the United States) who want to see NATO wither and be replaced by a transatlantic political community of "equals." NATO has been the best hope for the liberation of Europeans before. It should remain the cornerstone of Washington's European strategy in the global struggle for democracy.

Much is at stake in this next phase of U.S.-European relations. What a terrible irony it would be if, in its laudable efforts to reach out to Europeans, the United States were to encourage Europe to move precisely in the wrong direction. A direction that would, over time, do untold harm to American interests, and, in the end, to the interests of people who yearn for freedom around the globe. ♦

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Law and Borders

The conservative case for Bush's immigration plan.

By Tamar Jacoby

Douglas, Arizona

Lee Morgan's small, spare office has the somber feel of a personal shrine. A Vietnam veteran with 30 years' experience in the immigration and customs services, Morgan does undercover and investigative work on the Arizona border, now the gateway of choice for illegal immigrants entering the United States from the south. Everything in his lair in the dusty frontier town of Douglas speaks to his patriotism and dedication: his Bronze Star, his Purple Heart, the three folded American flags—comrades' commemorative flags—and proud photos of his fondest undercover busts. Like everyone who works on the border, he has had a new assignment since 9/11. The twin fights against illegal immigration and drugs, though not forgotten, have been subordinated to a new preoccupation—terrorism. But, tough and determined though he is, Morgan is far from confident that he can hold the line.

Every day last year, the immigration service apprehended some 1,400 illegal immigrants trying to cross into Arizona. Over 12 months, along the whole southern border, the total number arrested was more than a million. Morgan has seen too much in life to be anything but candid, and although it's his job to help catch these unauthorized migrants, he criticizes the apprehensions as a waste of time and resources. "They're just poor people trying to feed their families," he shrugs. But that doesn't mean he isn't concerned—very concerned. The main issue in his eyes: the distraction the immigrant influx creates. "What if another 9/11 happens and I'm responsible?" he asks. "What if the bastards come across here in Arizona and I don't catch them because I'm so busy chasing a busboy or a gardener that I don't have time to do my job—my real job—catching terrorists? I don't know how I'll live with myself."

Morgan's personal nightmare is one urgent reason why all Americans, no matter what their politics, should support President Bush's plan to retake control of our southern border. The White House proposal, introduced in early 2004 and allowed to drop from sight during the election year, is back on the table. The president laid out his ideas again in the State of the Union and is reportedly planning a major initiative to take the issue to the public later this spring.

Republicans are no less divided this year than last, and the White House has been working overtime to finesse those divisions. In early February it shrewdly avoided a confrontation in the House by backing a package of tough enforcement measures that many had expected would expose a rift between the president and less immigrant-friendly Republicans. Instead, the administration and its allies cast the "REAL ID Act"—the brainchild of powerful Judiciary Committee chairman James Sensenbrenner—as a first step toward the broader reform they seek, helping the measure pass by a healthy margin. But this will hardly end the discord in Republican ranks, and a major showdown is sure to come, both in Congress and, more broadly, among conservatives across the country.

The Bush plan has two key components: a guest worker program and a transitional measure that would allow illegal immigrants already here and working to earn their way onto the right side of the law and participate legally in the U.S. labor market. Conservative critics lambaste both elements, not just as bad policy, but as inherently un-conservative—out of keeping with core principles and detrimental to Republican interests. The impulse behind the challenge is understandable. Conservative criteria are different: not just security, but the rule of law, traditional values, and national cohesion—not to mention the interests of the GOP. It's also true that the president often touts his proposal in terms designed to appeal across the political spectrum. He talks about "compassion" and a desire to reward "goodhearted" workers, and sometimes this emphasis obscures the hardheaded, conservative case for his approach—a case that begins but does not end with America's economic interests. In reality, though, demonized as it has been on the right, the Bush plan meets every conceivable conservative criterion—with flying colors.

The president's Republican opponents often put their case as a rhetorical question—"What part of 'illegal' don't you understand?"—and the gibe hits home, not necessarily because of what it says about the Bush solution, but because it so accurately diagnoses

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what's wrong with the existing system. Our immigration system is indeed based on illegality—on a long-standing and all but deliberate mismatch between the size of our yearly quotas and the actual needs of our labor market, particularly at the lower reaches of the job ladder. This mismatch has often been convenient for employers—it provides a docile, disposable foreign labor force—and it has been the norm in agriculture off and on for nearly a hundred years. But in recent decades, new technologies have spurred demand for low-skilled workers in a wide range of other sectors as well, and the public, quite understandably, is beginning to find the hypocrisy intolerable.

As the president's critics understand, this is a large part of what is driving voters' concerns about immigration. People don't like the idea of 10 to 12 million illegal immigrants living in the United States but outside the law. They're appalled that entire American industries—not just agriculture, but hospitality, food processing, construction—operate on the wrong side of the rules, relying on the black market to find the labor they need just to keep their businesses open. The very idea of this second, illegal America is an affront, its practical consequences even more troubling: not just criminal syndicates that thrive on lawlessness, but also the haven it creates for potential terrorists. And the public is right: If routine illegality is the price of immigration, it's too high a price to pay—even if the newcomers are good for the economy.

So the critics' diagnosis is not far from the mark. But the question is what to do about this other, illegal America —and the fact is that the president has the best idea, arguably the only idea that can possibly work. Many of his critics believe that the answer is to turn off the immigrant influx. We should, they say, make the necessary economic adjustments and do without the imported labor. It's an option; with enough resources, we probably could stop the flow. But are the American people prepared for the changes that would come with that decision? The likely economic sacrifice is incalculable: not just a few extra pennies on the cost of lettuce, but forfeited growth all across the economy, on a vast scale. In many industries today, growth depends on foreign laborers, who filled one in every two new jobs created in recent years. Then there would be the cost of enforcement—a cost in dollars but also in the way we live. Just ask experienced agents like Lee Morgan: Cutting off illegal immigration would require thousands more men on the border, routine sweeps in every city, roadblocks, roundups, massive deportations, a national ID card, and more.

The president has a better solution. He proposes that we face up to the reality of our growing demand for labor, skilled and unskilled. His outline is still just that—an outline—and he is likely to leave it to Congress to fill in the details: to devise a way to match foreign workers with American employers, to make sure American laborers aren't undercut in the process, to design a method for monitoring employers and punishing those who don't comply, and so on. But the White House has nailed down the all-important central principle: If we raise our quotas to make them more commensurate with the existing flow of foreign workers, we can reap the benefits of immigration without the illegality that currently comes with it.

A new, more realistic policy would be much easier to enforce. The best analogy is Prohibition: Unrealistic law is extremely difficult to make stick. Realistic limits are another thing entirely. We can have robust immigration and the rule of law too—if, instead of wishing away the influx, we acknowledge reality, then find a smarter, more practical way to manage it. And that is exactly what the president proposes we do through his guest worker program. The idea is not to expand the total number of immigrants who enter the country each year, merely to provide those who are coming anyway—and would otherwise come illegally—with a safe, orderly, legal route. Assuming it works—assuming, as the White House does, that once most jobs are filled by authorized immigrants, there will be little incentive for others to come illegally—it's a simple, pragmatic solution, and that in itself should recommend it to conservatives.

Even more important would be the dividends for national security. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners enter the country each year without benefit of background checks or security controls of any kind. Then, once in the United States, they cluster in transient, underground communities, as often as not beyond the reach of the law. The president understands that we must come to grips with these potential terrorist havens, eliminating not just the illegal arrivals but also the illicit population that has accumulated here in recent decades. That's why he has included a provision that would allow unauthorized migrants to come in out of the shadows and get visas. Though mocked as a spineless, soft-hearted giveaway, this part of the plan too is driven by our needs—our security needs.

Under the Bush plan, foreigners seeking to disguise their identities would no longer find fake ID cards readily available on street corners in every American city. The Department of Homeland Security would have a much better grasp of who is here and what their names are and where to look for them if they turn up on an international watch list. Agents like Lee Morgan would be able to get back to their real jobs: tracking criminals and terrorists, not farmhands and busboys. And all this could be achieved

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without a draconian crackdown of the kind we would need were we to enforce the quotas we have, let alone close the border. Far simpler to bring the law back into line with market reality, then implement the new rules with modest, commonsense enforcement measures of the sort we rely on in every other realm of American life.

But isn't what the critics say true—isn't the president's plan in fact an amnesty? Not necessarily. It depends how it's done. Illegal immigrants should not be forgiven for breaking the rules; they should be offered an opportunity to earn their way back onto the right side of the law. Think of it as probation—that all-American idea, a second chance. The president is unequivocal: Unauthorized workers will not be permitted to jump the queue ahead of legal applicants waiting patiently for visas back in their home countries. And Congress should add other conditions. Those already in the country illegally should be required to pay a penalty; they should have to wait just as long as other applicants for full legal status. While they're waiting, they should be required to fulfill a variety of additional obligations: hold a job, pay taxes, abide by the law, take English classes, and demonstrate their commitment to American values. Once they've met these terms, it might even make sense to require them to go home to pick up their visas.

The vetting alone is sure to be a huge job, and it will have to be done with the utmost care on the part of law enforcement. But the truth is there's no other realistic way to eliminate the vast illegal world these immigrants inhabit: no other way to clear the ground in order to build for the future with a realistic, legal system of the kind the president envisions. After all, we as a nation aren't going to deport 10 to 12 million foreigners. However much they dislike the idea of illegal immigration, the American people aren't likely to have the stomach for that. Nor would it ultimately be in our interest. Surely it makes more sense to retain these trained, already assimilating workers than it does to send them home and start over with people who know nothing of the United States or its ways.

Does this mean it may be possible to bridge the gap between the president and his conservative critics? Well, yes and no. The critics are right about many things. Our current "nudge, nudge, wink, wink" policy is unacceptable. The erosion of the rule of law cannot continue. We must secure our borders against terrorists. The critics are also right to be worried about the costs that even legal immigrants impose on social services—primarily schools and hospitals—in the communities where they settle. Any overhaul of the immigration system must deal with those costs, and it ought to include a set of provisions, both carrots and sticks, to encourage assimilation. About all of that, there can be no doubt. The only catch: Just think a minute about this list of concerns. In fact, what the critics find intolerable is not the president's plan; it's the status quo.

The Bush package acknowledges the critics' concerns and attempts to address them with realistic solutions. It's designed to serve America's economic interest. It's our only hope of ending the hypocrisy that undermines our law enforcement. It's the best way to restore the rule of law in our workplaces and enhance security on the border. Issues of assimilation and local service costs are among the practical matters still to be thought through—on the table for Congress to tackle as it writes the legislation to implement the president's plan. But surely eliminating the barriers that now prevent 10 to 12 million U.S. residents from participating in the body politic and requiring them to pay their full freight in taxes would be a good start on both problems. And this can be accompanied by other, more proactive strategies like mandatory health savings accounts for guest workers and incentives for employers to offer them English classes.

Where the critics are most wrong—where they seem most shrewd but are ultimately the most misguided—is in their view of the politics of immigration. Here, too, they see the symptoms accurately enough. Americans are frustrated and angry. They know the system is broken; they want change. Uncertainty about just how to effect that change is driving a wedge into the Republican party, dividing the president from his conservative base in Congress and at the grassroots. And if the system isn't fixed, it could create a dangerous opening for Democrats: an opportunity for Democratic immigration hawks to outflank Republicans, not just on law and order, but even more devastatingly on security. All of this is true—and scary. But the answer isn't to block reform. The antidote is to deliver a remedy, as the White House proposes.

The president isn't misreading public opinion. If anything, he reads it better than his critics do. Most Americans aren't anti-immigrant. As poll after poll shows, what they want is to regain control—of both the border and the underground economy. The paradox at the heart of the Bush plan makes it a little hard to explain to voters. The president is promising to regain control by means of a more generous and welcoming approach to immigration. But that doesn't change the underlying truth: The Bush plan is the only way to restore the rule of law, either on the border or in our communities. It's the best answer to the critics' complaints, the only answer to the illegality that plagues us. And surely—no matter what the skeptics say—it can't be political suicide to give voters a solution to one of the problems that frightens and disturbs them most. ♦

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

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The Moral of Arthur Miller

By STEPHEN SCHWARTZ

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If Arthur Miller teaches us anything, it is this: Personal failure is not always a product of social injustice, and resentment is never a noble form of protest. Of course, his writings—from the 1949 *Death of a Salesman* to last year's *Finishing the Picture*—always insisted on the opposite. Miller's plays were filled with resentment, invariably finding society itself to blame for any flaw in the human condition. But the way he actually lived, that's the real drama. Arthur Miller's life is the great American morality play of the twentieth century.

Certainly all of America's newspapers thought so, even if they tended to get the moral wrong. When Miller died on February 10 at age eighty-nine, the media raced to tell the playwright's life as a story in which American hypocrisy and evil were overcome by the force of one man's talent and unyielding honesty. The *Washington Post*, while relating Miller's confrontations with the House Un-American Activities Committee, insisted he had been "blacklisted," a complete invention that not even Miller could have claimed for himself with a straight face.

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Across the nation, Miller was eulogized as a brave victim who had withstood the Babbitts and the McCarthys and the Mrs. Grundys to show America as it is. The *New York Times* hailed his "work that exposed the flaws in the fabric of the American dream," while the *Washington Post* divided the metaphor in two: the "Playwright of Broken Dreams" who "Showed Flawed Characters."

The American intellectual left has always differed from its European counterparts by holding out disillusion, rather than hope, as the basis of its message. Even the harshest plays of, say, Henrik Ibsen and Sean O'Casey were based on ideals of self-sacrifice and heroism, while Willy Loman, the hero of Miller's *Death of a Salesman*, represents a world in which heroism is absent.

But Arthur Miller was nothing if not a product of the leftist disaffection with American existence, and it is doubtless on this score that the *New York Times* could declare him the "most American" of our great playwrights. That's a curious conclusion, for *Death of a Salesman* hasn't aged particularly well. In the post-Reagan era of triumphant entrepreneurship, a drama proclaiming the uselessness of hard work and devotion to a job lacks the force it once seemed to have.

Still, in its use of language and skillful timing, *Death of a Salesman* has its points. It was with his 1953 play *The Crucible* that Miller fell entirely into the self-dramatizing of his own politics. The play has been read by millions of high-school students as a metaphor equating American anticommunism with the Salem witch trials.

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Lee J. Cobb as Willy Loman in a 1949 production of Death of a Salesman.

Here the essential mendacity of Miller's politics came to the fore. *The Crucible* effectively dramatizes the terror of false accusation and persecution. And yet, as Peter Mullen wrote in the London *Times*, "There were no witches in Salem, Mr. Miller. But there were plenty of communist enemies of the state in America." Indeed, the Moscow purge trials of the 1930s, in which people lost their lives, are a more significant parallel to the Salem tragedy than are the American congressional hearings of the 1950s, which caused a few to lose their jobs.

And yet, the effectiveness of *Death of a Salesman* and *The Crucible*—Miller's best work, by a large measure—suggest the man was something more than a propagandist turned into a literary icon, an author of minimal talent whose reputation was grossly inflated by the recusant left. Rather, he falls into the category of writers of some real talent whose careers were blighted by their allegiance to leftist ideology. Bertolt Brecht was such a figure. So was the Spanish poet Rafael Alberti, who began as a brilliant member of that country's literary generation of 1927 and ended as a Stalinist hack. So were the French surrealists Louis Aragon and Paul Éluard, who dedicated themselves to strident praise of the Russian secret police and its purge operations. The American left provided another, and worse, example in Henry Roth, author of the classic novel *Call It Sleep* (1934), who was convinced by the Communist cadres to turn his back on literature for years to work as a factory hand.

Miller never abandoned literature for proletarian employment, although he made a point of reminding people that he had worked in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, during World War II, as a shipfitter's helper.

His once popular *A View from the Bridge* (1955) mythologized the lives of longshoremen and other working-class characters. And yet, even in this later attempt to find some ordinary Americans whom he could treat as objects of empathy, he could not escape the overwhelming tone of dissatisfaction with America—or the self-dramatization of presenting "informers" as the nation's great evil.

Of course, many Americans remember Miller for something far from the lives of waterfront workers: his marriage to Marilyn Monroe from 1956 to 1961. The relationship was as political and social, in the Marxist sense, as it was psychological and sexual. Each was drawn to the other by a particular discontent. Monroe was inhabited by a desperate need to be taken seriously as an actress and as a person. Miller's capture of the most desirable female in the world was seen by his leftist admirers as their ultimate revenge after the humiliations they had suffered at the hands of anti-Communist union leaders, social democratic and other anti-Stalinist intellectuals, and congressional investigative committees. If the Communists could not seduce America, the "Lincolnesque" Miller had, at least, seduced The Goddess.

Sexual politics has a unique allure. The liaison of Trotsky and the Mexican artist Frida Kahlo, played on the screen by the steaming Salma Hayek in a recent film, keeps the old Bolshevik's name current among many for whom Trotsky's confrontations with Stalin mean little. Leftist acrimony was a deeply established element in Miller's personality. In his plays and interviews, he expressed his barely concealed rage at the society around him, which had disappointed him by its indifference to the simple verities of the 1930s left, both politically and in its aesthetic tastes. He never forgave American theater-goers for the turn in their affections from political pantomime to absurdist and other styles.

And similarly, he never absolved Marilyn Monroe for ending their marriage, soon after completion of *The Misfits*—a film about an uprooted cowboy, his friends, and a divorcée—written by Miller and released in 1961. One year and six months after its premiere, Monroe was dead from a fatal dose of barbiturates. Hollywood insiders have argued that Miller was cruel to her: Not only did he fail to provide her the reputation for artistic seriousness she craved, he and his circle held her in visible contempt for failing to share their political orientation. *The*

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Misfits was filmed in the Nevada desert in the height of summer, and the assignment proved extremely taxing for its male lead, Clark Gable, no less than for Monroe. Gable died of a heart attack shortly after the production wrapped up. Miller, who saw Monroe slipping away from him, and hated to let her go, had adopted the devastating habit of overanalyzing her every change in mood, which drove her deeper into depression.

The Misfits was directed by John Huston, who kept his camera trained on the outstanding features of Monroe's body, but the real theme was the same as that of *Death of a Salesman*. Gable, as the cowboy Gaylord Langland, and Eli Wallach, playing his sidekick Guido, have been shortchanged by American enterprise. They refuse to "work for wages," and instead hunt stray horses for sale as pet food. Miller's America was always a bleak, unrewarding place; but his social consciousness masked a personal heartlessness. His sense of America as a land of despair reinforced his permanent anger at the insufficiency of the adulation he received from critics as well as the public.

Hulton-Deutsch Collection / CORBIS

A scene from the original production of The Crucible.

But few imagined how deep his rancor went until 1964, when his play *After the Fall* was produced on Broadway. Aside from exhuming old Miller obsessions with governmental investigations of communism, *After the Fall* exposes a tortured intimacy between a lawyer, Quentin, and his second wife, the beautiful and highly sexual but dumb, corrupt, and drugged-out Maggie, a television star. Maggie is portrayed as the ultimate harridan, demanding that Quentin fulfill demeaning orders, enraged and jealous, and even accusing him of homosexuality. In a terrible scene, the couple fight over a bottle of pills and Quentin is tempted to kill Maggie.

Miller claimed, disingenuously, not to have imagined that the public would perceive this portrait as a vicious caricature of Marilyn Monroe. But they did, and little but condemnation would come to Miller for *After the Fall*. Robert Brustein, in a much-quoted review in the *New Republic*, called the play "a three and one half hour breach of taste, a confessional autobiography of embarrassing explicitness . . . there is a misogynistic strain in the play which the author does not seem to recognize. . . . He has created a shameless piece of tabloid gossip, an act of exhibitionism which makes us all voyeurs, . . . a wretched piece of dramatic writing." Those who understand the milieu from which Miller sprang will recognize something else in *After the Fall*: a classic Stalinist hatchet job, turned against a most unlikely target.

Miller was never capable of the self-examination and insight found in truly great artists. His 1987 autobiography *Timebends* was more notable for what it did not say than what it said, and much of the latter was provably dishonest, such as the specious claim that Elia Kazan, his on-again, off-again friend and collaborator, stole the substance of the Oscar-winning 1954 movie *On the Waterfront* from him.

To be fair, Miller inevitably recognized that it was incumbent upon him to denounce tyranny, especially against writers, in some Communist states (except, notably, Castro's Cuba), in addition to railing against the disappointments of capitalism. But his basic grudges, including his spite about his failure with Marilyn Monroe, never died. His last work, *Finishing the Picture*, was based on the making of *The Misfits*, and, once again, portrayed Monroe, under the name Kitty, as a mentally unstable pill-head. Deborah Solomon, writing in the *New York Times*, employed a feminist cliché with devastating accuracy: "Like any number of male intellectuals, Arthur Miller is not always wise when the subject turns to women."

What a life. All those plays, each straining to be the iconic declaration of the failure and pointlessness of American life in the twentieth century, when, really, it was Arthur Miller himself who best demonstrated the point. ♦

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Floridizing the World

The urban-renewal hipster Richard Florida looks to Europe for the next big thing. **BY FRED SIEGEL**

Michigan governor Jennifer Granholm was so impressed by Richard Florida's hipster approach to urban renewal that she created a "Cool Cities" initiative—complete with conferences and a raft of committees. All a city needs to do, it was argued, is attract the people Florida described as the "creative class," and all good things would follow.

And so, working with Kwame Kilpatrick, Detroit's self-described "hip-hop mayor," Granholm provided cachet for a downtown revival based on loft living, designer bread stores, and the like. But meanwhile the city of Detroit has been, in the words of economist David Littman, going into "a graveyard spiral." Detroit's tax rate is five-and-a-half times the average Michigan municipality, while its unemployment rate is nearly three times the national average. The residents who haven't fled are subjected to out-of-control crime rates and erratic street lights and buses—despite a vast municipal work force that was scaled to serve a city of two million but which now has barely 900,000 people.

There's a lesson here: Cool is nice, but it's the basics that count. Undeterred, Richard Florida has now produced a new book, *The Flight of the Creative Class: The New Global Competition for Talent*, in which he applies his concepts of "cool cities" and the "creative class" internationally. In attracting the cool, creative people who make the world go round, America, he argues, is losing out to New Zealand, Finland, the Netherlands, Canada, and—yes!—even Belgium. He presents, understandably, no statistics to back up these assertions, since Canada, for instance, sends nearly twice as many skilled people to the United States as the reverse. As for Belgium, it's worth noting that Brussels, the capital of Belgium and the European Union, has an unemployment rate of 22 percent, while the French-speaking Walloon areas have 19 percent unemployment. The Flems of Belgium, with a mere 9 percent of people out of work, are increasingly looking to secede from the nation Florida asks us to take as a model.

The Flight of the Creative Class
The New Global Competition for Talent
by Richard Florida
HarperBusiness, 315 pp., $25.95

The Anglosphere Challenge
Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century
by James Bennett
Rowman & Littlefield, 352 pp., $39.95

The United States of Europe
The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy
by T.R. Reid
Penguin, 305 pp., $25.95

Richard Florida is a genius at self-promotion. But along the way in his astonishingly successful career, his sales pitch has been subject to mocking critiques by such students of urban economics as Joel Kotkin, Steve Malanga, and myself. Part of *The Flight of the Creative Class* is a response to those critiques—and yet, in the end, expanding his notion of cool cities and the creative class to embrace the entire world, Florida shows he has learned nothing. The book takes his one over-simple idea and spins it out into 315 pages that simply reiterate his earlier argument.

Oddly enough, however, Florida does manage to stumble onto an important point, even if it doesn't mean quite what he thinks it does. To draw out the point, you have to compare Florida's work with some other recent books. Take, for instance, *The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century*, in which James Bennett, a high-tech entrepreneur and political commentator, offers a far more upbeat assessment of the United States.

The high levels of trust and accountability that characterized the English-speaking world helped create the industrial revolution in the past, Bennett argues, and these will pave the way to the future as well. Bennett jumps around from subject to subject, sprinkling his text with interesting aperçus (including a discussion drawn from the historian Alan Macfarlane on how liberty in the English-speaking world emerged far earlier than previously supposed). But at the core of this book is the argument, backed up by numerous examples, that open societies, which place individual rights before the group rights beloved in continental Europe, are more likely to allow innovation and successful adaptation to changing conditions.

There is, however, a glaring and crucial exception to Bennett's account of flexibility and adaptation: the failure of the American educational system to reform itself. In the United States the educational establishment is the equivalent of the European public-sector interests, which demand stasis at all costs.

Here we reach toward Richard Florida's one point of interest. Just as the American trade deficit requires an infusion of foreign investment, the vast deficits in the U.S. educational system require the importation of foreign talent. But since the attacks of September 11, Florida notes, it has been harder for foreign students and scientists to get visas for the United States. At the same time, other countries are doing a better job of retaining homegrown talent and attracting foreign scientists.

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If *The Flight of the Creative Class* were a serious book, Florida would have discussed the need to balance security and immigration policy—and then turned to the extraordinary failure to reform American education. Twenty-two years after the wave of educational reform set off by the publication of *A Nation at Risk*, little has improved in the secondary schools. Indeed, parts of American academia have descended further into the swamps of postmodernism. But Florida never deals with any particular place or institution, or with the messy realities of political cross-pressures and intransigent interest groups. Instead he engages in what is best described as "abstracted empiricism," in which a long series of charts are displayed to show that tolerance and creativity are important for economic growth. And who doubted that?

Florida never points to the core countries of the European Union as major technological competitors—and with good reason. Despite a superior educational system and despite a record of extraordinary scientific achievement, Europe as a whole is falling further and further behind the United States. You can see this most clearly if you examine the actual facts presented in recent books like *The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy*. As the title suggests, the author—*Washington Post* journalist T.R. Reid—imagines that Europe is somehow going to triumph. It is a wish as much as a thought, for readily available facts run against Reid's thesis. Is Germany losing 1,200 jobs a day? Has the German unemployment rate reached record levels? Is the French economy stagnant? Are the French consumed with a sense of decline? Is Europe suffering a democratic deficit? Reid tells us not to worry. Confusing political clout with economic success, he takes heart in the fact that European regulators were able to humble Jack Welch and General Electric.

The United States of Europe is essentially a rewrite of James Goldsborough's 1982 *Rebel Europe: How America Can Live with a Changing Continent*, which came out when an earlier explosion of anti-American passion was reaching one of its many fever peaks over Ronald Reagan's response to a Soviet missile buildup. Europe, Goldsborough told his readers, is a "new breed of Superpower" that has "responded with clear-sightedness and creativity to economic and political situations the United States has chosen to ignore."

Richard Florida

HarperBusiness / Jeroen Oerlemans Photografie

Reid acknowledges that the Europeans, who are the most pessimistic people in the world, are suffering from technophobia; they invest 40 percent less in research and development than the United States. But he can't bring himself to even mention the problem of integrating the continent's Muslim masses in order to maintain an unsustainable welfare state. Nor can he grasp the looming threat to European manufacturing posed by China.

Europe's failings are, for Reid, more than compensated by the check he hopes they will impose on American power. When Reid was stationed in Japan for the *Washington Post*, he wrote about the coming Asian century. His time in Europe has now produced similar predictions about a coming European economic superpower.

Like many others—Richard Florida included—T.R. Reid refuses to recognize the cost to the Europeans of their over-the-top anti-Americanism. With Europe's sense of its own superiority at stake, proposals for labor-market flexibility can be denounced as "American proposals" or "Bush-style thinking." As in the Arab world, innovation and reform are easily demonized by decrying them as Anglo-American, an inverted recognition of sorts for the values Bennett's Anglosphere honors. We should take no comfort from Europe's problems, or Richard Florida's fatuities. The United States has for too long been living off Europe's failings. There are, Joel Kotkin notes, some 400,000 European science and technology graduates working in the United States, and only a fraction plan to return to Europe. Given the hopeless mess we've made of education, we will need them to combat the challenges coming from China and India.

Still, in the long run, it would be a mistake to bet against the United States and the Anglosphere. The frameworks proposed by Richard Florida and T.R. Reid are crashing on the rocks of reality. The United States, its failings notwithstanding, is, given its traditions and basic strengths, likely to eventually rise to the challenge. ♦

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Women and Girls

Louisa May Alcott in her time—and ours.

BY BETTY SMARTT CARTER

Louisa May was the prettiest of Bronson Alcott's four daughters—or so you must believe if you admire Louisa's tomboy alter-ego, Jo March. The heroine of *Little Women* had "a decided mouth, a comical nose, and sharp gray eyes, which appeared to see everything, and were by turns fierce, funny, or thoughtful. Her long, thick hair was her one beauty; but was usually bundled into a net to be out of the way. Round shoulders had Jo, big hands and feet, a fly-away look to her clothes."

Little Women, Little Men, Jo's Boys
by Louisa May Alcott
Library of America, 1,045 pp., $40

Betty Smartt Carter is a novelist and author, most recently, of the memoir Home is Always the Place You Just Left.

Maybe it's the Massachusetts connection, but reading that description, I picture John Kerry scampering around Concord in a hoopskirt. Louisa made her heroine Jo awkward and impetuous, with an air, a humor, even a vocabulary ("Christopher Columbus!") more suited to a lively Yankee boy in the 1860s than to a girl from a good family, brought up to be a picture of frailty and grace. And Jo was, in most ways, a true portrait of Louisa in her youth. Tall and long-limbed, the young Louisa had a "rather masculine air," according to her childhood friend Edward Emerson, son of the famous transcendentalist (whom she playfully called "Rolf Walden Emerboy"). Another friend remembered Louisa "romping and racing down the street, usually with a hoople higher than her head."

For all her boyishness, though, Louisa was "a big, lovable, tender-hearted, generous girl, with black hair, thick and long, and flashing, humorous black eyes," wrote Nathaniel Hawthorne's son Julian, who lived next door. Edward Emerson called her "fine-looking," and early daguerreotypes agree. All the Alcott sisters had strong jaws and noses, but Louisa's features composed themselves into a pleasing regularity. The face on the new Library of America edition of her three March family novels—*Little Women*, *Little Men*, and *Jo's Boys*—is both sensitive and serene, with dark eyes and soft cheekbones that balance the conviction of the mouth. This is a forceful woman, yes, but not the one who declared herself to be, in the words of Jo March to the amorous Teddy Laurence, "homely, awkward, and old."

It's not so surprising that Louisa disguised her prettiness on paper, shifting the role of "beauty" to the oldest sister in *Little Women*, Meg March (Meg's inspiration, Anna Alcott, was as gentle as her fictional counterpart but not so pretty). Louisa may even have believed in her own plainness. Who, after all, treated her like a beauty? The men she admired (Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne) were old and famous and kept their distance. Teddy Laurence never bounded over the hill to propose (Julian Hawthorne was far too young). No Professor Bhaer waited for her under an umbrella, saying "I will haf her if I die for it!"

And, besides, the novel worked better with Jo plain. Until Jo's arrival, heroines of novels—at least, of novels written for the edification of girl readers—could be victims, or vixens, or a little of both; but they were always feminine, always ladylike. And here was Jo March: whistling, soiling her dress, chopping off her hair so that she looked even more like a gangly boy. Jo was a comic heroine, a foil for herself.

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Tomboys everywhere rejoiced; girls all over America wanted to be her friend.

To Louisa, Jo offered certain theatrical advantages. The author was a born ham, a would-be actress. She didn't need to invent the plays the March girls put on in the parlor. Those were genuine melodramas from her own childhood, when she really did play swashbuckling heroes opposite her sister Anna's shrinking-violet leading ladies. Julian Hawthorne writes of walking over one day to visit Louisa's little sister Abby, on whom he had a secret crush. At the gate, he met her flirting with a visiting English gentleman. This odd-looking fellow stared stonily at Julian through his monocle and addressed the boy "with insufferable condescension": "I couldn't deny his grace, charm, and high-society bearing. He was slender and dark and wore a black broad-cloth suit and soft black felt hat.... He twirled an absurd switch cane and occasionally caressed the points of a tiny black moustache."

Just as Julian was getting his dander up, though, the hat fell off the gentleman's head, "letting a thick mass of black hair fall down to his waist." Julian gasped as Louisa laughed uproariously and dashed back to her house yelling, "April Fool!"

Louisa brimmed with such dramatic and comic sense, and she poured all of it into her best works. It's no wonder that stage versions of *Little Women* are a staple of high school theater, or that the book has so often found its way to the movie screen. Louisa wrote it almost as a play: That's why characters talk without much interruption, why monologues drift on for sentences without any mention of who's speaking. As for Jo, Louisa inhabits her the way an actress inhabits a great role. Jo is the perfect part for Louisa to play.

It wasn't enough for Louisa Alcott to play a part, though. In the Alcott family, creativity existed side by side with a fervor for religion and good works. The two streams didn't always blend well. Louisa's father, Bronson Alcott, was a difficult figure, both idealistic and theatrical, a cross between a hermit and a transcendental chatterbox. Most of his great ideas (a utopian community, experimental schools) came to nothing. After the failure of "Fruitlands," his ironically named utopia, he fell into a suicidal depression. What saved him, Louisa wrote later, was his fear that his family might perish without him.

Bettmann / CORBIS

Katharine Hepburn as Jo March in the 1933 movie version of Little Women.

But the truth was that the family might have perished *with* him. Real salvation for the Alcotts came in the friendship of Ralph Waldo Emerson, the loyalty of kin, and, above all, the mind-boggling perseverance of Louisa's mother, Abigail. Nicknamed Abba, she miraculously made a good home from nearly nothing. She loved her husband without cynicism and her children without reserve. More than that, she dragged all of them out of themselves and into the world of good causes. Were the Alcotts poor? Abba knew that others were poorer. She and her daughters fed the hungry and cared for the homeless and sick. Sister Lizzie really did die (like her namesake, Beth March) after catching scarlet fever from children her mother tended.

Louisa changed her father's character somewhat for *Little Women* (she represented him more accurately, if humorously and affectionately, in an essay called "Transcendental Wild Oats"). Her mother, though, she allowed to shine full-strength in her *Little Women* portrait of Marmee March, the all-loving, all-patient woman who dispenses wisdom to her daughters at the climaxes of several early chapters.

"Oh, mother! help me, do help me!" cries Jo, after a terrible episode of temper. Marmee tells Jo that she's been struggling for forty years to tame her own sharp tongue. She owes her progress to the help of her gentle husband and the love of God: "I'm angry nearly every day of my life, Jo; but I have learned not to show it; and I still hope to learn not to feel it, though it may take me another forty years to do so."

This is a revelation to Jo, one that sets her on her own "pilgrim's progress" toward self-control. "If I'm ever half as good as you," she declares to Marmee, "I shall be satisfied!" The rest of *Little Women*—really the whole

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Elizabeth Taylor as Amy March in the 1949 version of Little Women.

March family chronicle through *Little Men* and *Jo's Boys*—charts Jo's transformation into a virtuous matriarch. It's a little disappointing to those of us who prefer the young Jo March, but by the time her *Little Men* are growing up, "Mrs. Jo" has indeed become another Marmee, a motherly soul ready to care for all the waifs who drift her way.

In real life, too, Louisa was becoming her mother. During the Civil War, she announced her intention to work as a nurse at the Union Hotel Hospital in Washington. Her decision may have shocked a few Concord neighbors, but not Louisa's abolitionist parents (John Brown's daughters had boarded at their house the year before). She kissed her mother goodbye and set out on the very journey that Marmee would take in *Little Women*.

Six weeks later her father fetched her back, desperately ill with typhoid, head shaved and face ghostly pale. She spent three more weeks in a delirium, dreaming she was married to a handsome Spaniard, visiting heaven, being burned as a witch. She recovered, but lived the rest of her life with the ill effects of the "mercury cure"—the treatment for the disease at that time.

The whole nursing scheme sounds dangerous and doomed to fail, more like one of her father's grand plans than something her practical mother would have undertaken. Fortunately, the experience fed Louisa's creativity even while it wrecked her body. She'd always had a taste for the morbid and melancholy, yet she was generally better when writing close to life (autobiography tamed her literary excesses). In the Union Hospital she saw violence, passion, racism, and redemption firsthand. Here, misery mingled with hope and artistry with heroism. Louisa had no need for artifice. Two of her best works, "Hospital Sketches" and "My Contraband," were the result.

Besides the cost to her health, Louisa paid a social cost for refusing to live an ordinary life, for seeking out "something to do," as she called it. By not staying home, by looking for causes to fight for (from abolition to suffrage), she hurt her chances of simply getting married and having a family. Maybe it wasn't such a huge sacrifice; she said later that liberty made a better husband. But she was, in Julian Hawthorne's words, a "lovable, tender-hearted" woman, and her works show that she often had love on her mind. Perhaps she wondered now and then what it would be like to live as her mother did, creating children as well as novels. When sister Abby died after childbirth, Louisa was quick to adopt her little niece. She also stayed close to her nephews, who appear (as brother and sister) in *Little Men* and *Jo's Boys*.

In fiction, too, Louisa paid a price for being unconventional. It's always been a puzzle why Jo March turns down Teddy Laurence. From the moment the boy bursts into the story in chapter three of *Little Women*, we all know that Jo's going to marry him—young love must grow into mature love: That's what literary convention teaches. But Teddy is Jo's own puckish spirit, the child half of herself. To marry him would be to stay a girl forever, never to grow into an independent woman like Marmee. So Jo defies convention and chooses kindly, wise Professor Bhaer, an older man somewhat like Louisa's father. As fictional consolations go, he's not all that great (the audience at my husband's high-school production of *Little Women* booed when Jo accepted him). As a catalyst to Jo's transformation, though, he's perfect.

So many of us who read Louisa May Alcott's books as children long for the domestic coziness of the March family. We wonder if there are still mothers like Marmee, who balance love and tolerance with the pursuit of moral perfection. We wish children still read great books, played outdoors, put on theatricals, obeyed their parents. In short, we long for the past, or at least an idealized past, when closeness and warmth seemed more possible.

So it's a wonderful gift from Louisa that her March family will always be there for us to visit, year after year, without change. Returning to Concord, we'll seek out Marmee for moral guidance, we'll weep over the loss of Beth, we'll delight to watch how Amy redeems poor, spurned Teddy. Most of all, we'll find Jo March, that awkward, funny girl on her way to becoming a great woman. "I do think," she'll say with gusto, "that families are the most beautiful things in all the world!" ♦

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

"Do you have a tattle-tale protection program?"

Books in Brief

***Casanova in Bolzano* by Sándor Márai (Knopf, 304 pp., $22).** In 1756 Giacomo Casanova escapes from a cell under the ducal palace's lead roof in Venice, making his way in the tattered remains of a silk suit, to the small town of Bolzano. Arrogantly, confidently, he commandeers the finest room in the local inn and sits down to think on the sixteen months erased from his life by his imprisonment: "Alone, excluded from the world, in the name of virtue and morality, of which I am the sworn enemy—or at least that is what the *messer grande* said when he had me arrested."

So Sándor Márai begins *Casanova in Bolzano*, his novel originally published in 1940, in Hungary where he had been one of the most celebrated authors of the 1930s. Márai and his work were both rejected by the postwar Communist regime. He left, ending up in San Diego, California, where he eventually committed suicide at age eighty-nine in 1989. Three years ago, an English translation of his *Embers* appeared, a sad, wise, witty tale of two old men discussing a crime and a passion from forty years earlier.

Now, in *Casanova in Bolzano*, Márai tells of a hero positively brimming with energy and fire. Has he lost his touch? Leisurely he kisses little Teresa, the maid with rough, red hands coarsened by work, who barely can raise her eyes to his. No, he has not lost his touch. After three days he wonders, "Can she be the One?" The One he has ever been questing after.

But the One may be Francesca, over whom Casanova and the duke of Parma fought a duel by moonlight when the young woman was only fifteen. Casanova fell to the duke's sword, and the duke wed Francesca. The duke, a much older man, has been consumed by the conviction that his young wife still loves his seductive rival, and comes to the inn with a strange proposal, bringing with him a letter she has written to Casanova: *I must see you.*

Instead of killing Casanova, the duke makes the famous seducer an offer: He will reward him most handsomely if Casanova will spend one night making love to his duchess—and then somehow hurt her just enough to cure her of her romantic illusions.

The last third of the book is the meeting at a costume ball, Francesca dressed as a slim gallant, and Casanova more sad than comic in an elaborate ball gown. Francesca asks, "How does one seduce and then disabuse someone who has come of her own free will because she is in love? . . . I am very curious, Giacomo! What will you do?"

The duchess talks through the night and as dawn comes, she takes her leave: "I saw you, I was tender to you, and I hurt you." Adjusting her three-cornered hat on her wig, she adds solicitously, "I hope I did not hurt you too much." Which is not quite the last word of this vivid, clever, worldly book.

According to Knopf, a number of Márai's novels are in the process of translation—this one, by George Szirtes, is first rate—and we shall have the pleasure of discovering more of a lost world.

—Cynthia Grenier

***The Final Solution: A Story of Detection* by Michael Chabon (Fourth Estate, 131 pp., $16.95).** All the way back in 1912, Ronald Knox wrote a parody of European scholarship called "Studies in the Literature of Sherlock Holmes," and in the decades since, Arthur Conan Doyle's creation has been the subject of more parodies and pastiches than anyone can count. Fortunately, Michael Chabon hasn't written one. Or, rather, he has. But *The Final Solution* is something far more: a tiny, perfectly constructed novel that explores what it would be like to be an old, old man—and a genius faced with one last puzzle. A long-scheduled review of the novel for THE WEEKLY STANDARD never materialized, but it would be a disservice to let this work go without notice. I gave several copies away for Christmas, with the note, "This is a real book, for a change." Real books—genuine novels, with all that implies—are extremely rare these days. Read this one. Don't let it slip away.

—Joseph Bottum

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Navy to Commission Attack Submarine Jimmy Carter
—News Item

Parody

Ship's Log
Captain Jimmy Carter

April 2
After having surveyed the Easter Island elections, which I found most heartening, I directed that Ship's head be put towards Antarctica & we commenced our long passage of 3,200 miles to meet with the North Antarctic penguin king Beak Il Swim. A game of cards was commenced abaft the Mizzen Mast that made all hands most merry, with loud laughter & high spirits, tho' curiously truncated following my arrival & my own foray into conversation, as the men did one by one exit in the succeeding three minutes, thus depriving my lively account of Rosalynn's fly fishing feats of a fittingly appreciative publick.

April 14
This day, a light current carried us southerly, & the hours should have been peaceful but for the intrusion of a sea creature most unwelcome. Even as we drifted at Forty Knots this thick-fur'd intruder with rabbit-like visage did pursue us with great vigor, making fearful some hands, although I suggest my screams had a bracing effect and improv'd morale. With reluctance did I order the use of scarce weaponry, tho' noted with joy that the 14th torpedo providentially dispelled the threatening remains. I suggested a restrained celebration might enliven the evening, but few men seemed to share my relief & elation.

May 4
Met today with Beak Il Swim. I should have been distressed with the emaciation of North Antarctica's birds and black & white uniformity had I not seen portraits and sculptures most attractive of the Leader everyplace, bespeaking an affection both genuine & touching. I spoke to Chairman Beak and did express my wish that he reduce in size his plan to exterminate ev'ry penguin in South Antarctica, a suggestion to which he acceded in a gracious & hearty manner. His mere request in return was fifty billion Cod and our assistance in constructing, as he did call it, "the Planet's largest Cannon." To be sure, said I, hearten'd. It is a region most orderly, and I found Chairman Beak to be vigorous, intelligent, & surprisingly well-informed.

May 20
Several times during the Voyage the Crew have showed themselves quiet with detectable hostility & melancholia, despite my extensive talks. After meeting with ev'ry member of the crew for two weeks & listening well to their concerns, I gathered the hands yesterday eve & spoke to them with great sternness. My words I found to be novel & full of interest; and I saw fit to remind them that they were inexcusably unhappy. I reminded them of my oft-spoken words on deathly typhoons with my well-belov'd daughter Amy, to wit: If they were to rise above spiritual failings & gloom, perhaps they might join myself in tossing their coats & embarking on an endless stroll with no foreseeable direction in subzero temperatures. I do believe this resounded with them.

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Victories against Terrorism

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The scars are too fresh, the mistakes too profound, the human tragedy too deep for anyone to gloat. But with free elections held in Palestinian territory and Iraq, the emergence of Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian leader, and the whispers of support for democratic reform in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and even plucky little Qatar, one begins to sense that **freedom can prevail over terrorism—even in a difficult part of the world**.

The task ahead is not easy. In the Middle East, for example, the familiar "final status" issues—borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees—will continue to tax the moral courage of statesmen, angering constituents, frustrating allies. Cynical or simplistic voices will sometimes confound those of a more nuanced tone. The trowel and the plastic bomb, both wielded by extremists, may once again clash as instruments of national destiny.

In Iraq, the terrorists retain the ability to kill at random and in considerable numbers. Conflicting factional interests will require painstaking arbitration. Sunnis must join the government, leaving their Baathist or extreme Wahabbi identities at the door.

Still, it is worth noting the similar approach Israel and the United States took in countering terrorist challenges, both acting despite great domestic opposition, little international support, and mounting casualties.

The first imperative was to contain the physical threat. To prevent the suicide bomber pandemic from turning every bus ride, discotheque visit, or dinner out into a Russian-roulette-type experience, Ariel Sharon reoccupied areas on the West Bank and Gaza from which Israel had earlier withdrawn. President Bush courageously endorsed this action as well as Israel's refusal to deal with those "compromised by terror."

The United States was slow to build up its forces in Iraq or to provide the right kind of equipment, problems addressed only in recent months. As important, a coherent plan for training Iraqi forces is now in place.

Second, the operations of both countries exacted a price on populations supporting the terrorists. Israel established checkpoints throughout the most troublesome areas, inhibiting Palestinian commerce, agriculture, and travel. Israeli soldiers arrested thousands of suspects and began building a wall of separation. They reasoned—rightly—that when the burden of supporting terrorism became intolerable, most Palestinians would stop supporting it. From Sadr City in Baghdad to Falluja, to the Sunni "Triangle of Death," the United States began to apply the same lessons. **Resident populations came to understand that the terrorists deliver neither freedom nor pride, only misery.** Intelligence improved dramatically.

Third, Israel, the United States, and Iraqi democrats always held out the promise of better times for those choosing conventional politics over the gun. For Palestinians that promise is mobility, autonomy, and, eventually, statehood. For Iraq's Sunnis it means participation in political life.

Terrorism is, by definition, a political act. When it fails, its stars lose their luster. On Iraq's election day, Mocktada al-Sadr, the once formidable mullah, was figuratively trampled by followers marching past him to the polls. Abu Musab al-Zaqarwi—with his terrorist lieutenants in custody and his name an embarrassment on the Arab street that once cheered him—cursed democracy and its adherents from his hiding place de jour. Nobody seemed to listen.

—Robert Zelnick

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